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In 2003, I performed community service at an orphanage in a semi-rural area in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), a South African province located along the Indian Ocean, which had been the scene of political violence between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the African National Congress (ANC) during the 1980’s and 1990’s. I have been interested in intra-state conflicts ever since, which in particular seem to ravage sub-Saharan Africa. Having returned from a study trip to South Africa in 2006, I wrote my Bachelor thesis on the internecine violence between the IFP and the ANC in KZN. Once I had been accepted into the internationally oriented Master’s programme in Conflict Studies and Human Rights, I immediately considered to visit South Africa for a third time. After a while, however, I came to realise that it was about time to face new challenges. Thereupon, I decided to focus on Northern Uganda instead, which past, present and future are equally fascinating. Thus, on March 17th, 2008, I flew to Africa’s tarnished pearl to conduct research on the auxiliary forces (AFs) that have fought against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an insurgent group that has been operating from the late 1980s onwards. 
It must be stressed, however, that I would not have been able to carry out this research if it had not been for the help of particular persons. Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude to the following individuals. First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents, who selflessly supported me throughout my studies, mentally as well as financially. Tige tank!
	Secondly, I would like to thank Victor Oloya, Chairman of the War-affected Children Association (WACA), a Gulu-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) that addresses the needs of former LRA abductees. He introduced me to the local authorities and (former) Local Defence Unit (LDU) members. In addition, he functioned both as interpreter and boda-boda (motorcycle taxi) driver. Bob Okello fulfilled similar duties, enabling me to interview survivors of the Barlonyo massacre.​[1]​ Their passion and intimate knowledge on the conflict were a source of inspiration to me. 

Thirdly, I would like to thank all the people I have interviewed, particularly those who had to relive some of their war experiences. In addition, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Charles Bongomin, Paddy Ankunda, Ronald Kakurungu, Martin Mapenduzi, Samuel Egadu, Frank Nyakairu, Tonny Atara and Robert Adiama, who made a lot of precious time available for me. 
	Fourthly, I would like to thank the Okot and Van Zanten families, who hosted me in Gulu Town and Kampala respectively. Their hospitality and warmth made me feel at home in a country that hardly bears any resemblance to the Netherlands.

















1.1	Research topic and theoretical problem
The conflict in Northern Uganda has been dubbed by United Nations (UN) Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland as “the biggest forgotten and neglected humanitarian emergency in the world” (Green 2008:83). James Nyeko, Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) programme coordinator, also defines the civil war in case as one of ‘the most forgotten conflicts’, remarking bitterly: ‘From 1986 up to 2000, no serious interest was paid by the international community. When it came to the UN annual report, most Ugandan affairs were mentioned in annexes’.​[2]​ 
	The sheer brutality of the LRA insurgency, particularly the use of children, has nonetheless attracted considerable attention from both the (international) media and academia. For example, the infamous 1996 Aboke kidnapping, in which LRA rebels abducted 139 school girls from St. Mary’s College, stirred worldwide attention and has been vividly described by Africa correspondent Els de Temmerman in Aboke girls, Children abducted in Northern Uganda (Kampala 2008).
	Various blind spots, however, have remained with regard to the humanitarian crisis in Northern Uganda. For instance, little attention has been devoted to the militias that fought alongside the government army against the LRA. Dr. Archangel Byaruhanga Rukooko, who has researched militias in Uganda himself, conceptualises militias as follows: 
A militia is a group of citizens organised to provide military service. It is usually a supplementary or reserve army, composed of non-professional soldiers and not necessarily supported or sanctioned by the government, thereby making it distinct from the regular army of a nation. It can serve to supplement the regular military as an irregular reserve, or it can oppose it, (...). Consequently, militias are often of a less professional character and intended to carry out emergency tasks of a military nature (Francis 2005:213).  
As will be shown further on, Rukooko’s definition is highly applicable to the government-related militias discussed in this thesis.
Although some reports and other accounts – such as Abducted and abused, Renewed conflict in Northern Uganda (Washington, London and Brussels 2003) which has been published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) – do briefly refer to these militias, there is no extensive literature addressing this aspect of the LRA war. This has been confirmed by Major Fabius Okumu, Director of the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS), an institute attached to Gulu University.​[3]​ Having detected a knowledge gap, I set myself the task to research the AFs involved.
I had merely two prime motivations to do so. First of all, researching these AFs enables us to acquire a more prudent understanding of the insecurity which has prevailed in Northern Uganda for over the past two decades. With the LRA having relocated itself to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it is equally interesting and relevant to assess the contribution AFs have made to the counter-insurgent effort against the LRA. 
Secondly, the emergence of paramilitary bodies in Northern Uganda can be seen as part of a wider phenomenon, for numerous militias have come to the fore across the whole of Africa, like the Interahamwe in Rwanda, the Janjaweed in Sudan, the Kamajors in Sierra Leone and the Mayi-Mayi in the DRC. Strikingly, little has been written on these armed forces that either support a particular government or conduct state-undermining activities – let alone that this development has been theorised to a large extent (Francis 2004:1). To give an example, when using Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) – an interdisciplinary citation index product – to search for articles on militias in Africa, the results are scant.​[4]​ 
It is unfortunate that Africa’s militias in general, and the AFs in Northern Uganda in particular, have been largely overlooked so far, for looking into civil defence forces permits us to analyse, among other things, the relationships between those involved in armed conflict, which in turn determine to a large extent people’s behaviour. 
Thus, this research aims to describe the process by which AFs were organised and mobilised for collective action by exploring the dynamics and identifying the mechanisms of collaboration between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the local communities inhabiting the Greater North of Uganda.​[5]​ The relationship between both entities is interestingly characterised by conflicting and mutual interests, which demands to be further scrutinised. This theoretical problem is worthwhile to tackle, because it explains why and how violent collective action – in this case AFs countering the LRA – comes about.
Figure I. Area of research 

Showing Uganda’s sub-regions that have been affected by the LRA insurgency (Green 2008:32). 
1.1	Analytic framework
Analytic insights will be predominantly drawn from theoretical discussions of collective action. If discontent, mobilisation and political opportunity converge, one will likely witness the emergence of collective action, the theory in case propounds. Although the theory of collective action has been originally developed to explain the process by which insurgents are organised and mobilised for armed rebellion, it can also be applied to counter-insurgents. This has been demonstrated, for instance, by Mario Fumerton in From victims to heroes, Peasant counter-rebellion and civil war in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000 (Amsterdam 2002), which looks into peasant self-defence committees in the Peruvian department of Ayacucho. Fumerton describes the Andean peasants in Ayacucho who took up arms against the Maoist guerrillas of Shining Path as an example of counter-rebellion. Interestingly, there are some striking similarities between these civil defence committees in Peru and the AFs in the Greater North of Uganda, which I will map out through comparative analysis. 
The notions of discontent, mobilisation and political opportunity are key in explaining the emergence of collective action. The first notion pays attention to dissatisfaction and grievances experienced by those who resort to violent collective action. The second dimension addresses the ideology that is being used to justify violent collective action and the capacity to organise: recruitment, fundraising, leadership, internal communication and decision-making. The third factor of analysis is political opportunity, involving public opinion support, a favourable political climate, state sponsorship, etcetera (Oberschall 2004:27-28). 
Figure II. Collective action theory – 
depicting the dynamics between discontent, mobilisation and political opportunity

Drawn by Mario Fumerton.




Prior to my departure to Uganda, I conducted an extensive literature research on the conflict in Northern Uganda. The articles, booklets and reports I read gave me a solid understanding of the armed rebellion the LRA is waging against the GoU. As has been mentioned, I familiarised myself with various academic authors, whose analytic tools proved useful in theorising the AFs. 
	Once in the field, however, I predominantly conducted interviews in order to generate data concerning the AFs. The three constituent parts of the collective action model helped me with recognising ‘evidence’. Since the AFs form subject of intense debate, I made sure to listen to all sides of the story. Thus, I interviewed a wide variety of individuals, ranging from (former) LDU members and survivors of war crimes to (opposition) politicians and army spokesmen. Meanwhile, I verified whether things one told me corroborated with statements made by other interviewees and independent sources of information. Thus, I sought to establish why and how AFs were built up. 
	In total, I interviewed over forty persons, including six former LDU members, six serving LDU members and a couple of internally displaced persons (IDPs).​[6]​ I have refrained from mentioning them by name, because they have entrusted me with sensitive information. The bulk of (former) LDU members and IDPs could barely speak English, which made me dependent on a translator. Relying on such an intermediary had two main disadvantages. First, it obstructed me somewhat to communicate directly and second, I could not be entirely sure that the translations and interpretations I was given were accurate, since I could not speak Lwo​[7]​ myself. Fortunately, I had gotten in touch with my interpreters through reliable contact persons. Besides, I triangulated their translations and interpretations with other interview data and document research. Thus, I have reduced considerably the risk of translators ‘hijacking’ my research to pursue their own political agendas. In addition, they were both intimately familiar with the conflict, the region and its people and they perfectly understood the significance of my research topic and its pertaining sub-questions. In this sense, their participation was an enrichment rather than a limitation.  
	Apart from the language barrier, I had another obstacle to overcome. After my first round of interviews with former LDU members in Ajulu-Patiko IDP Camp, some requested to be ‘financially compensated’, whereas the issue of money had not been raised beforehand. Having discussed the matter with my interpreter, I decided to refrain from offering financial rewards, figuring it would prompt poverty-stricken IDPs to pretend to have served in an LDU.
	Having outlined my data-collecting techniques, one can see that the methodology employed in this research is clearly qualitative. After having interviewed six serving LDU members, the military authorities prohibited me to interview any other LDU members. I could not access the records of the AFs either, because the statistical data they contain were considered to be too sensitive. Thus, it was virtually impossible to approach my theoretical problem quantitatively. 
1.1	The thesis structure










Before turning to my research topic, I will briefly describe the politico-historical context in which AFs were formed. One cannot understand these government-related militias without taking into account the genesis and course of the conflict. Events in the past determined the relationship between the GoU and the people in the Greater North of Uganda, which in turn profoundly impacted the counter-insurgency against the LRA of which the AFs became part of. Since the AFs and the conflict’s history are interwoven with each other, I deem it crucial to address Uganda’s violent past first. 
2.2 The bush war in Luwero​[8]​ 
In 1979, Idi Amin’s reign of terror came to an end when the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), backed by various Ugandan opposition forces, invaded Uganda and overthrew Amin. In the wake of the Uganda-Tanzania War (1978-1979), highly contested elections were held and Apollo Milton Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) declared itself the winner. Thereupon, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) launched a protracted people’s war to undo Obote’s seizure of power. As a result, a gruesome bush war ensued between the NRA and the government Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) in an area to become known as the Luwero Triangle.​[9]​ 
	The concept of deploying local defence forces was already utilised during the war in Luwero, with the NRA mobilising civilians as informants and guides, who had the advantage of knowing the terrain well. They would gather intelligence with concern to the UNLA’s whereabouts. In case of the UNLA advancing somewhere, these early warning centres would call in an NRA response force to counter the enemy. In order to inform the NRA on an enemy advance, drum signals or other means of communication were used.​[10]​ 


Figure III. The NRA’s popular defence system – a community-based approach

Sketched by a former UPDF major who has served in the bush war himself.
In Luwero hundreds of thousands of civilians got brutally killed. Up to now, it remains somewhat unclear who to blame for the widespread atrocities committed against the civilian population in Luwero. For quite some time ill-disciplined UNLA soldiers, aided by the National Security Agency (NASA) and the UPC Youth Wing, were widely held responsible for having perpetrated gross human rights violations. However, persistent rumours have it that some NRA guerrillas would dress up like UPC Youth Wingers and massacre people in Luwero, prompting their relatives to support the NRA.​[11]​ Colonel Walter Ochora, the Resident District Commissioner (RDC)​[12]​ of Gulu, believes this was the case. It does not seem to surprise him that such tactics might have been adopted: ‘In a guerrilla war you can’t rule out anything’.​[13]​ 
	It is crystal-clear, however, that the war in Luwero drastically widened the gap between Northerners and Southerners, which had come into being during the colonial era. Obote was a Lango​[14]​ from the North, whose UNLA consisted predominantly of Northerners.​[15]​ Museveni, on the contrary, was a Munyankole​[16]​ from the Southwest corner of the country, who mainly generated support amongst Bantu-speaking peoples in the South. 
Meanwhile, the UNLA had fallen prey to in-fighting, pitting Langi against Acholi. On July 27th, 1985, Obote was ousted by some of his UNLA commanders. Major General Tito Okello, an Acholi, succeeded him, but his presidency proved rather short-lived. On October 26th, 1986, Museveni captured the capital city of Kampala. The UNLA, weakened by internal power struggles, appeared unable to prevent Museveni from securing state power. The capture of Kampala made the NRA one of the few guerrilla forces that has succeeded in defeating a government without having a foreign base. Museveni’s push on Kampala angered the Acholi, because he had previously signed a power-sharing agreement with Okello in Nairobi. To this day, many Acholi refer bitterly to Museveni’s dishonourment of the Nairobi Agreement as the ‘Nairobi peace jokes’. Frank Nyakairu, a senior conflict and human rights reporter, speaks of a defining moment: ‘The Acholi have mistrusted Museveni ever since’.​[17]​  
2.3 The war shifts to the North 
In response to Museveni’s victory, thousands of ex-UNLA soldiers fled northwards, where various rebel movements surfaced, including the UPDA and Alice Auma’s Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). As a matter of fact, the conflict in Northern Uganda can be viewed as a continuation of the war in Luwero. The big difference was that this time the NRA was casted as the national army fighting rebels.​[18]​ 
Various factors can be identified why armed rebellions sprang up in the North. First of all, the Acholi felt betrayed, because ‘their’ president had been deposed by Museveni. Secondly, in the process of conquering Acholiland, elements within the NRA committed heinous acts against the Acholi populace to avenge the ‘skulls of Luwero’. Third, Karamojong warriors​[19]​ allegedly armed by the NRA rustled numerous heads of cattle, crippling severely the economic wealth of the Acholi. Thus, a new cycle of violence was set in motion.
	There was a marked distinction between the UPDA and the HSM, which battled one another despite having a common enemy. The UPDA was founded by former UNLA soldiers and politicians, who used a secularised political discourse, proclaiming to restore multi-party democracy. UPDA Brigadier General and Commander of Forces Odong Latek, a former UNLA commander, employed conventional guerrilla tactics to combat the NRA. Alice, however, claimed to be a spirit-medium​[20]​ and constructed a powerful belief system fusing Christian symbolism with spiritism to mobilise her fellow Acholi. Operations by the HSM were directed by the Holy Spirit Tactics, which disregarded all military principles. Charles Bongomin, attached to the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Kampala as Senior Advisor Northern Uganda, reasons quite arguably: ‘If all rebel groups had been united under one single leadership, Museveni would have experienced more trouble to consolidate his power’.​[21]​ 
Alice’s rebellion proved by far the most spectacular one. After an epic campaign covering hundreds of kilometres her rebel movement was decisively defeated at Magamaga (near Jinja Town) in late 1987. Anointed with mooya (shea butter nut oil), Alice’s Holy Spirit warriors believed to be bullet-proof, but this appeared not to be the case. An NRA veteran who served at Magamaga recalls: ‘After they [the HSM rebels] had come within range, we opened fire with everything we had. The magic didn’t work; they died in droves!’​[22]​ About 3.000 of Alice’s adherents were mowed down mercilessly. Alice herself managed to escape to Kenya, where she would die in exile.
Warfare through magical acts is not altogether uncommon in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1993, for example, some South African journalists witnessed how isiXhosa-speaking ANC supporters in a township west of Johannesburg received intelezi (a protective potion) from a sangoma (traditional healer) to make them immune to enemy bullets and courageous in their low-grade civil war against the rival IFP (Marinovich & Silva 2000:105-108). Heike Behrend, however, stresses that magical thinking is not confined to Africans exclusively. It is commonly known, for example, that some soldiers along the Western Front during the First World War (1914-1918) wore talismans to ward off bullets (Behrend 1999:61).
Various explanations have been given to account for the HSM’s final defeat at Magamaga. Alice’s father Severino Lukoya Kiberu, for instance, believes that the Holy Spirit ceased supporting his daughter’s cause after He had detected ‘wrong-doers’ within the HSM.​[23]​ Notwithstanding, one major factor that contributed to Alice’s failure seems more down to earth. Although the HSM, originally an Acholi entity, was reinforced by members of other Nilotic population groups in the course of its march on Kampala, it failed to generate popular support amongst people in the Bantuphone South (Behrend 1999:84). The Southerners regarded the rebels from the North as Anyanya (‘barbarians’ or ‘savages’), who had previously committed atrocities in Luwero. The Basoga in particular cooperated fully with the NRA, denying the HSM recruitment ground in Busoga and isolating its members, which culminated ultimately into the crushing of the HSM at Magamaga.​[24]​ On June 3rd, 1988, the GoU concluded a comprehensive peace agreement in Pece Stadium, Gulu Town with the mainstream of the UPDA,​[25]​ formally terminating the first phase of violence in Northern Uganda.   
2.4 The conflict mutates into an anti-people’s war 
Although the NRA succeeded in quelling two full-blown popular insurgencies relatively quickly, Acholiland continued to witness rebel activity. A hard core of bush fighters continued the armed struggle, gradually evolving into to the Uganda Christian Democratic Army (UCDA), later to be named the LRA. In contrast to its predecessors, the LRA – which was led by Joseph Kony – proved remarkably resistant to military defeat. Like Alice, Kony claimed to possess supernatural powers, but he abandoned the Holy Spirit Tactics and adopted classical guerrilla tactics instead, which could be attributed to the influence the former UPDA leader Latek exercised over Kony.​[26]​ In this sense, the LRA can be seen as a combination of the HSM and the UPDA.
While the UPDA and the HSM had enjoyed considerable support amongst the Acholi people, particularly in the beginning, the LRA faced an appalling lack of popular support from the onset onwards. Once it became increasingly clear that no rebel force could defeat the NRA swiftly, the vast majority of the Acholi lost its interest in rebelling soon. In order to fill its ranks, the LRA resorted to forceful recruitment, leading to large scale abductions of mostly children. The phenomenon of child soldiering was nothing new in Uganda, for Museveni had recruited hundreds of child soldiers during his armed insurrection against Obote, who were affectionately referred to as Kadogos, meaning ‘little ones’ in KiSwahili (Green 2008:47). 
In March 1991, Major General David Tinyefuza – the then Minister of State for Defence – launched Operation ‘North’ in a bid to crush the LRA. His ruthless cordon-and-search policy failed to distinguish innocent civilians from rebels, which resulted into massive human rights abuses. Inflicting severe collateral damage upon the population, the NRA alienated itself from the Acholi as an occupation force. Operation ‘North’, nonetheless, delivered a severe blow to the LRA. According to Ochora, who was involved in this operation as an NRA brigadier, it forced the rebels ‘to flee to Sudan as refugees’.​[27]​
As part of Operation ‘North’, Betty Bigombe – the Minister of State for Pacification of Northern Uganda – urged her fellow Acholi to organise themselves into ‘Arrow Groups’.​[28]​ Bigombe’s call marked the beginning of the use of AFs against the LRA, thus making self-defence militias almost as old as the insurgency itself. It proved to be a disastrous beginning, however. The Arrow Groups had to rely on bows and arrows and were no match for Kony’s gun-toting rebels. Acholi peasants taking up traditional weapons against the LRA would have their hands hacked off; women raising the alarm would have their lips sliced off. Kony’s brutal response turned even more Acholi away from his ‘God-guided’ cause, but at the same time the Acholi blamed the GoU for having denied them guns to protect themselves. The GoU was clearly hesitant to arm the Acholi against Kony, fearing the former might rebel again.​[29]​ 

2.5 The internationalisation of the conflict 
In Sudan Kony allied himself to the National Islamic Front (NIF), the Arab regime residing in Khartoum. From 1994 onwards, the NIF provided Kony with sophisticated weaponry and rear bases in Southern Sudan. This should be interpreted as a response to Museveni’s policy of backing John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), a rebel movement based in Southern Sudan. With the LRA becoming a proxy force of the Khartoum regime, the conflict acquired a geopolitical dimension. The ‘Khartoum factor’ undoubtedly prolonged the duration of the conflict, which is often highlighted by UPDF officials, including Major Paddy Ankunda, National Spokesman of the UPDF: ‘The Government [of Uganda] hasn’t been fighting the LRA per se; it has practically been fighting Khartoum’.​[30]​ 
The external support the LRA received from Khartoum transformed the conflict significantly, turning the LRA into a force to be reckoned with. Thereupon, AFs named Home Guards – later on to be called LDUs –​[31]​ came into being. Whereas the Arrow Groups had more or less emerged out of spontaneous local initiative, the  LDUs were established under the guidance and supervision of the government army. 
2.6 The IDP phenomenon
It is safe to say that the LDUs in Acholiland were primarily tasked with guarding and policing the IDP population in the ‘protected villages’. These refugee camps form a huge controversy in terms of what conflict party should be held accountable for the massive displacement of people in Northern Uganda. Obviously, Kony bears a good deal of the responsibility, since he brutalised the people for having failed to support his struggle unconditionally. On April 20th, 1995, for example, LRA rebels went on a killing spree in Atiak (a trading centre 71 kilometres north of Gulu Town),​[32]​ slaying between 200 and 300 civilians (Justice and Reconciliation Project 2007:7). Unsurprisingly, the military authorities – Ankunda included – describe the IDP phenomenon as a result of the LRA forcing people out of their habitat: 
In Africa people live in villages, dotted all over the place, which makes it impossible to protect every individual. When the LRA started mass-killing and abducting people, the Government [of Uganda] advised people to move into concentrations. It was not that the Government wanted to have people in camps; the solution was dictated by insecurity.​[33]​
	HRW, however, is skeptical of such an explanation, suspecting the GoU of having adopted the ‘draining the sea’ strategy. This classic counter-insurgency tactic aims at drying up the sea [the civilian population] in which the fish [the insurgents] swim.​[34]​ To illustrate its case, HRW refers to the infamous evacuation order of October 2nd, 2002, which was orally issued by the army:
This announcement goes to all law-abiding citizens in the abandoned villages of Gulu, Pader and Kitgum districts to vacate with immediate effect. (…) This is because we have discovered that the LRA terrorists when pursued by the UPDF hide in huts located in these villages. (…) Get out of these villages in order not to get caught in cross fire (HRW 2003:62).  
Forty-eight hours after the order was given, the UPDF allegedly began shelling and bombing the areas surrounding the camps, perceiving everyone found outside the camps as either a rebel or a rebel collaborator (HRW 2003:62). 
Colonel Francis Achoka, once appointed as an IDP protection officer, dismisses such allegations as ‘political propaganda used by the Opposition’ to discredit the GoU. According to his understanding, the GoU had to choose between two evils: either curtailing the right to freedom of movement or leaving the people unprotected.​[35]​ Whatever the case may be, the government’s policy of forceful displacement dissatisfied plenty of Acholi, who became entirely dependent on international relief, since they could no longer engage in subsistence farming.
2.7 ‘Iron Fist’ and the spread of the conflict 
After the relationship between Khartoum and Kampala had normalised considerably, the Sudanese government granted permission to Uganda to cross the border. In March 2002, the UPDF launched Operation ‘Iron Fist’, targeting the LRA bases in Southern Sudan. Despite having deprived the LRA of its sanctuary in the South of Sudan, HRW does not regard ‘Iron Fist’ as a success, since it triggered a “boomerang effect”. With the UPDF being occupied in South Sudan, the LRA penetrated deep into Uganda, affecting areas which had previously remained unscathed (HRW 2003:12).
On June 15th, 2003, the LRA made its first incursion into Teso. In the wake of what some Iteso have called their ‘September 11th’ (Lomo & Hovil 2004:51), Arrow was formed.​[36]​ After the LRA had been flashed out of Teso, it aspired to overrun Lango. Previously, Lango had witnessed sporadic LRA raids along its border with Acholiland. This time, however, rebel activity affected eighty per cent of the sub-region. As a response to this security threat, Amuka (Lwo for ‘Rhinoceros’) was created, which became operational in December 2003. Amuka played an important role in repulsing the LRA from Lango.​[37]​
According to an assessment carried out by the UPDF and the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) in 2004-05, the total strength of LDUs in Acholiland was 11.704. By the end of 2005, Teso harboured 6.812 Arrows and Amuka numbered 10.288 troops (GoU 2006:44). Rukooko questions the validity of these government figures, arguing that probably half of the militia members listed on payrolls does not exist. Tax money supposedly allocated for these ‘ghost’ militias is subsequently distributed amongst Museveni’s clientele. In other words, Rukooko reasons that no one can tell the precise number of militiamen deployed in Uganda: ‘Not even Museveni knows!’​[38]​	
2.8 Conclusion




The first notion to account for the emergence of collective action is discontent. When explaining why insurgents resort to armed rebellion, one verifies whether those involved perceive a lack of opportunity for economic well-being, advancement, security, political participation and the pursuit and expression of cultural rights. In contrast to insurgents, government-related militias are primarily dissatisfied with armed groups opposing the State, not the State itself. In this sense, they are the “opposite” face of rebels (Kalyvas 2006:107). 
In this chapter I am going to look into the motivating and conducive factors that made people decide to join AFs countering the LRA. I have come to discover that people take all kinds of concerns into account when deciding how to respond to a particular security threat, in this case Kony’s rebel group. Whereas some militia members joined out of conviction, determined to defend their villages and families, opportunism seems to have been instrumental in shaping people’s behaviour. Therefore, I am going to discuss how the LRA’s terror tactics, conditions of socio-economic deprivation and state power affected people’s decisions to serve in AFs. Additionally, I will explain why the government army played a pivotal role in the emergence of militias. Thus, it will become evident that the formation of AFs was a demand-driven affair, born out of the various interests of Northern Ugandans and the GoU.   
3.2	Guerrilla warfare and terror tactics
As early as 1991, Kony encountered local defence forces opposing him in the form of Arrow Groups. Seeking to reaffirm population control, he stepped up violent attacks against the Acholi. Ironically, rebel movements often direct violence against the very people they purportedly represent. In 1983, for example, Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán ordered the massacre of over eighty villagers at Lucanamarca for having organised a civil defence force (Fumerton & Duyvesteyn 2007:22). There is clearly a relationship between guerrilla warfare and terror tactics, which should be addressed when explaining why people organise themselves into civil defence militias.
Generally, guerrilla armies fight asymmetric wars, since they are usually inferior to their opponents in terms of strength and weaponry. The LRA does not form an exception to this rule. Kony’s tiny force of between 500 and 3.000 fighters has faced at least 40.000 to 60.000 UPDF and militia troops for about two decades (Vinci 2005:361). In order to sustain their armed struggle, guerrillas need force multipliers, hence the importance of fear. Fear, which has been defined by United States (US) Major Gregory A. Daddis as “a physical and emotional response to a perceived threat or danger” (Vinci 2005:369), is often – if not always – used as a tactic by warring parties to maximise their perceived threat. Fear can cause combat ineffectiveness, varying from momentary paralysis to the fleeing of a unit (Vinci 2005:374). 
The Belgian war correspondent Dirk Draulans, for instance, observes that the Mayi-Mayi – a Congolese people’s militia opposed to the presence of Rwandan and Ugandan forces in the DRC – had primarily psychological terror at its deposal to deter enemies from entering the hills which were supposedly theirs. In doing so, the ill-equipped Mayi-Mayi fighters created a culture of fear, claiming to be omnipotent through the use of witchcraft (Draulans 2003:238-239). 
 The LRA has used fright to paralyse UPDF soldiers as well as civilians. Not for nothing were the rebels referred to as otong-tong, which translated from Lwo means ‘those who chop their victims to pieces’. Using terror as a means to immobilise the civilian population enabled the LRA to achieve particular objectives with a minimum use of manpower. Father Carlos Rodriquez, for example, has reported an illustrative story of a seventeen year old boy who had his ears, lips and fingers cut off by the LRA. The rebels subsequently wrapped the boy’s ears in a letter, which read: “We shall do to you what we have done to him” – intimidating those who considered to join an LDU. Thus, through the use of excessive violence the LRA communicated a powerful message, reminding the people of the unacceptability of serving in LDUs (Vinci 2005:370). Therefore, Anthony Vinci has come to the conclusion that although the LRA’s terror tactics may be shockingly savage, they are nonetheless rational and serve strategic purposes (Vinci 2005:377).      
3.3	Implicit and explicit terror
Having explained the significance of terror in guerrilla warfare, it is important to make a conceptual distinction between implicit and explicit terror. Implicit terror is generated by the mere threat of physical violence, which aims at convincing people that the rebel movement is more powerful than the state. Once the terror becomes explicit, however, the rebels will invariably loose popular support (Fumerton 2002:304-307). 
In other words, excesses against ordinary people can play a strategic role in securing population control, but if the guerrillas become too much of an explicit terror, such strategies will ultimately generate counter-productive results. The LRA has clearly overstepped the thin red line between implicit and explicit terror by indiscriminately brutalising the civilian population. Through the use of indiscriminate violence it succeeded to a large extent in terrorising civilians into submission. There are stories known, for example, where villagers willingly handing over former LRA abductees to the LRA in order to escape from the rebels’ wrath.​[39]​
However, one can say that the LRA somewhat underestimated the people’s capacity to endure acts of unspeakable terror. People across the Greater North of Uganda perceived the LRA’s actions and strategy as a threat to their personal security, to their property and to their kith and kin. Out of people’s disaffection with the rebels’ conduct grew organised forms of collective action. Whether such initiatives to defend oneself were successful is not the issue here. In spite of incredibly high levels of trauma and intimidation, a considerable number of Northern Ugandans defied Kony’s terror tactics to take up arms against him. 
Regarding people’s responses to atrocities committed by insurgents, Stathis N. Kalyvas – Arnold Wolfers Professor of Political Science at Yale and Director of the Programme on Order, Conflict and Violence – observes that fear and revenge often drive people into pro-government militias (Kalyvas 2006:99). This was certainly the case in the Greater North of Uganda. Two former LRA abductees I have interviewed primarily joined an LDU out of fear, figuring the rebels would kill them for having deserted.​[40]​ The story of an Amuka member from Apala Hill, whose child had died of malaria, illustrates strikingly the second motivation Kalyvas mentions. Tonny Atara, the proprietor of a popular restaurant in Lira Town who was involved in convincing people to join Amuka, recalls:
  
When his wife and some elderly women kept vigil at night, the rebels attacked the place. They threw the child’s corpse out of the window and raped the young lady in front of the elderly women, so you can imagine why he wanted revenge.​[41]​ 

Another example of revenge is a female LDU member, whose husband had been killed by the rebels. Following her husband’s death she developed a desire to take revenge, which made  her decide to join an LDU.​[42]​ One former LDU member, who had been involuntarily recruited into an LDU,​[43]​ was initially not much interested in fighting the LRA, but he changed his mind 180 degrees when rebels killed his mother.​[44]​ In this sense, Kony’s violent messages unwittingly backfired, multiplying his enemy’s force too. 

3.4	Socio-economic deprivation
It would be rather simplistic, however, to exclusively interpret the emergence of AFs as a popular backlash against Kony’s use of explicit terror. When explaining how Iquichano peasants counter-rebelled against Shining Path, Fumerton also took into account their scope of economic and social resources, since these structural variables are “the most important ones affecting the manner of response, and the ability to organise counter-rebellion” (Fumerton 2002:303). 
Fumerton came to discover that members of the Iquichano communities were mainly monolingual Quechua-speakers, who had very limited intercourse with the cash economy and little if any migratory experience. Since the vast majority of the Iquichanos did not meet the requirements for surviving in urban society (skills, education, bilingualism, some degree of literacy, cash, etcetera), the idea of abandoning their villages and displacing to a town or city was an unappealing option. Putting up a resistance against Shining Path, on the other hand, appeared to be a reasonable alternative (Fumerton 2002:303).   
	The Iquichanos and those who joined the AFs in Northern Uganda seem to have much in common in terms of socio-economic conditions. Not many alternatives were available to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who were held hostage in IDP camps for many years. Most of them used to be subsistence farmers, who could no longer access their lands. Up to now, most of the land in Acholiland lies fallow.​[45]​ The war had impoverished the people dramatically and there were few, if any, income-generating activities. 
To make matters worse, the safety of IDPs was by no means guaranteed. Ankunda states that LRA insurgents ‘sometimes’ succeeded in infiltrating IDP camps,​[46]​ but it is commonly believed that LRA infiltrations into the camps were of a more frequent nature. As Bongomin remarks critically:

Despite the fact that people were in IDP camps, so many got abducted inside the camps! All of the military barracks would be in the middle of the camps, so the people were guarding the UPDF instead of the other way around. At times the UPDF was with too few, so when about 100 rebels came, both the IDP population and the UPDF would run away.​[47]​ (Emphasis added)
 	
	Living in structural poverty and facing high levels of insecurity, the IDPs stood merely with their backs against the wall. Joining an AF became for many a means of survival. The socio-economic profile of former and serving LDU members I have interviewed in Ajulu-Patiko and Lukodi IDP Camp​[48]​ seems to confirm this. None out of six former LDU members had enjoyed any education beyond the primary level. With respect to serving LDU members, only two out of six had received some instruction at the secondary level. Only one out of these twelve interviewees could be interviewed without the assistance of an interpreter. For the overwhelming majority working experience remained confined to subsistence farming and military service, so one’s career options were pretty limited. Since LDU members were officially entitled to a monthly salary of Ush. 60.000,​[49]​ many low-educated and unemployed IDPs had clearly an economic incentive to join an LDU. ‘It [joining an LDU] was a last resort to have some basic income’, Bongomin observes realistically.​[50]​  
	
3.5 Control and collaboration
Apart from the provision of material benefits, control can also ignite collaboration. Therefore, Kalyvas argues that it should not be taken for granted that people who are collaborating with a political actor are genuinely loyal towards this agent, since civil wars produce strong incentives to falsify preferences (Kalyvas 2006:93). 
For example, when explaining why army brutality did not drive Ayacuchano peasants on a large scale into the ranks of Shining Path, Fumerton stresses that they made informed decisions based, among other things, on the military balance of power. Most peasants, he says, were awed by the army’s firepower, which made them doubt whether the guerrillas were ever capable of bringing down the Peruvian State. Thus, many peasants found themselves forced to side with the State “in spite of, or perhaps precisely because of, the ferocious military repression and the terrifying psychological intimidation it effected” (Fumerton 2002:306-307). 
For this reason, Kalyvas finds it problematic to conceptualise popular support in terms of attitude, preference or allegiance. He rather thinks of support as a behaviour or action, since people can be coerced to alter their behaviour that may not be consistent with their preferences (Kalyvas 2006:92). Having detected an overlap between control and collaboration, Kalyvas has formulated a hypothesis, which states: “The higher the level of control exercised by a political actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with this political actor will be” (Kalyvas 2006:111). This proposition appears to be very useful in explaining why Northern Ugandans joined AFs.
	Similarly to the security situation in Ayacucho, the State in the Greater North of Uganda was perceived as the stronger party. Although the LRA instilled fear into both government soldiers and civilians, it could neither engage in head-to-head confrontations with the UPDF, nor defend fixed positions. ‘The LRA has never ever captured a village’, Achoka remarks.​[51]​ Indeed, the rebels’ repertoire was mainly restricted to hit-and-run tactics. ‘They [the rebels] didn’t have permanent bases in Uganda; here [in Uganda] they were always on the run, carrying light arms and moving in small numbers’, Captain Ronald Kakurungu – Spokesman of the Gulu-based 4th Infantry Division – points out.​[52]​ The LRA was relatively secure in the bush, but it could never hope to take the towns by storm, hence the nickname olum-olum (Lwo meaning ‘those who stay in the long grass’). Since the UPDF was considered the superior force, people rather collaborated with it instead of opposing it. 
This does not imply, however, that all people serving in AFs were fervent supporters of Museveni’s NRM Government. On the contrary, most Northern Ugandans believe that the Greater North of Uganda has been marginalised by the GoU. This sense of marginalisation, which stems from historical reasons I have described in the previous chapter, has been continuously expressed in the country’s voting pattern. During the 2006 presidential elections, for example, the country north of the Nile had once again voted in favour of the opposition (Green 2008:58). To sum up, the high level of control the GoU exercised significantly determined people’s behaviour, causing many Northerners to serve in government-related militias although this was not necessarily consistent with their political preferences.

3.6 Explaining the army’s reliance on AFs
As can be seen, civilians could have had multiple reasons for joining an AF. When it comes to the agenda of the military, the picture is once again multidimensional. Various reasons can be identified why the UPDF needed to be beefed up. To begin with, government and army officials are quick to refer to international donors, such as the World Bank, that made the GoU cut its Defence budget in the early 1990’s. Fearing to lose access to particular development aid funds, the GoU processed the army through a far-reaching retrenchment exercise. Consequently, people were recruited into AFs to fill security gaps that had come into being.​[53]​ 
	Second, the nature of the LRA insurgency made the government army dependent on AFs. Dennis Ojwee, a senior journalist who has covered the conflict from the very beginning onwards, stresses that during her crusade Alice engaged in open confrontations with the NRA, whereas Kony dodged military detachments and attacked soft targets instead.​[54]​ As has been mentioned, the LRA would operate swiftly, dispersing itself into small units. This, in turn, forced the army to be mobile too, which would leave the communities unprotected.​[55]​ Besides, the whole of Northern Uganda – roughly the size of Belgium – was simply too vast to be covered by the army alone. A military attaché in Mozambique has described such a security dilemma as the  “big country, small army problem” (Kalyvas 2006:139).
	 The ‘ghost’ factor also negatively impacted the army’s capacity to deal with the LRA, which for many became the embodiment of the greed dimension to the LRA war. It has been discovered that UPDF commanders were involved in filling the army register with ‘ghost’ soldiers and thereby creaming off money into their pockets. The UPDF 4th Division, which for years spearheaded the counter-insurgency against the LRA, appears to have been at the centre of this practice. General Aronda Nyakairima, operational commander of ‘Iron Fist’, testified to a committee chaired by Amama Mbabazi how ‘ghost’ soldiers in 4th Division hampered his campaign:
It is a very disheartening phenomenon when one considers a unit [Battalion] supposed to have a strength of 736 officers and men​[56]​ having only strength of 250 or so, (...). This means that the missions supposed to be executed by 736 are left to 250 and cannot be successfully executed in operations; our units suffer unnecessary casualties at the hands of the enemy. This over stretching of personnel has resulted in operational fatigue, low morale and desertion of troops (Atuhaire 2008).    
Kakurungu doubts the authenticity of the quotation, arguing that the Mbabazi Committee never released its report, which makes him wonder how Sunday Monitor could have obtained such a revelation. Nevertheless, he admits that ‘ghost’ soldiers have been created in the past: 
It’s no longer a secret. In terms of strength, it was a little bit of a challenge. (...) It [the creation of ‘ghost’ soldiers] could have been one of the factors that contributed to the prolonging of the [LRA] insurgency.​[57]​ 
The ‘ghost soldiers scandal’ undoubtedly tarnished the image of the UPDF severely.
Another reason why the military found itself under deployed can be found in Museveni’s foreign policy. In spite of having faced twenty-two insurgencies during his presidency (Justice and Reconciliation Project & Quaker Peace and Social Witness 2008:2), Museveni has decided to get militarily involved in various conflicts abroad. Martin Mapenduzi, the District Speaker of Gulu,​[58]​ sneers at Museveni’s military interventions: 
He [Museveni] wants to be the cock of his Africa. You find the Government [of Uganda] sending its forces to [the Democratic Republic of] Congo and Rwanda. In other words, you’ll lose concentration if you’re picking many battles. The resources you have aren’t utilised in a concentrated manner.​[59]​ 
It is evident that the army faced some acute deployment gaps while countering the LRA. Self-defence groups were an appealing solution to fill such gaps, because these had particular advantages over the regular force. First of all, AFs are a cheaper means of recruiting and maintaining an armed force (Francis 2005:214). A militiaman’s salary sharply contrasted with a UPDF soldier’s one, which amounted Ush. 140.000 a month.​[60]​ Secondly, since auxiliaries were supposed to remain in their respective localities, they knew the area in which they operated intimately. This advantage significantly smoothed the process of gathering intelligence and detecting rebel activity. ‘They [the AFs] were the best source of intelligence’, Achoka  - who played a prominent role in mobilising and training LDUs – claims.​[61]​ Thirdly, because AFs were locally based, they could immediately respond to any security threat posed in their designated areas.​[62]​ Besides, since the AFs consisted of people who spoke the local language, they were by many civilians regarded as a ‘trusted security mechanism’, Achoka states. The government army, on the contrary, was – particularly in the beginning – viewed upon as an occupation force.​[63]​ Moreover, as AFs were essentially tasked with protecting their own people and property, they were deemed more devoted than government soldiers who came from all over the country. Last but not least, many militia members had already acquired fighting experience in the past – either as a government soldier or as a rebel. Thus, ‘they [the AFs] knew all the tricks’, Ochora emphasises.​[64]​
3.7 Conclusion
Counter-insurgency experts point out that similarly to forced population removal, governmental militias aim at controlling the civilian population and depriving insurgents of their population basis (Kalyvas 2006:122-123). In Northern Uganda the massive displacement of people had created a lumpen proletariat of IDPs. These had not much choice but to opt for violent defensive action: one could still be targeted by the LRA inside the camps and there were virtually no possibilities to generate any kind of income whatsoever. Facing a lack of better alternatives, many choose the side perceived to be stronger, which resulted into large scale collaboration with the GoU. Thus, a combination of multiple factors – that is Kony’s terror tactics, poor socio-economic living conditions and a high level of control exercised by the GoU – made thousands of people serve as auxiliaries.  
The military, in turn, relied heavily on community-based forces in its battle against the LRA, because it was too unfamiliar with the situation on the ground and struggled with a lack of manpower, which can be attributed to reduction-in-force (RIF) policies, the nature of guerrilla warfare, corruption and sheer misallocation of military resources. AFs – which were well-suited for their tasks, because of their familiarity with the terrain and the people –  proved a useful mechanism through which the GoU could isolate the LRA and expand its control over a population which had a reputation for resenting the Museveni administration.





















Having described why AFs appeared on the scene in the counter-insurgency against the LRA, does not explain how people were mobilised and organised. This chapter will look at the mobilisational and organisational aspects of my research topic, since one cannot sustain violent collective action without organisation, mobilisation and management. This dimension of collective action is comprised of five elements, namely leadership, the legitimisation of violent defensive action, recruitment, resources and perceptions of cost-benefit. Studying these five categories allows us to reconstruct how the GoU succeeded in mobilising thousands of Northern Ugandans against the LRA, which in turn will bring us one step closer to understanding these civil militias as an example of violent collective action. While mapping out the mobilisation process of AFs in the Greater North of Uganda, I will point to similarities and differences between the way people were mobilised in the three sub-regions I have visited (Acholiland, Lango and Teso). As will become evident, local dynamics profoundly impacted the manner in which people were mobilised.  
4.2 Leadership
Although the Arrow Groups of the early 1990s had been sanctioned by the GoU, they did not enjoy any state support in terms of military and financial resources. The AFs that came into being at a later stage were also formed at the local level, but were essentially a state-coordinated initiative. As Uganda has been uninterruptedly ruled by Museveni’s NRM since 1986, most leaders involved in mobilising people were aligned to the country’s ruling party. For example, Captain Mike Mukula and Felix Okot Ogong, Chairmen of respectively Arrow and Amuka, were both NRM-supporting politicians. Consequently, the AF became somewhat associated with the NRM, making opposition politicians believe that the GoU used AFs as a tool to pursue its own political agenda. I am going to elaborate on this aspect in the next chapter, which tries to establish, among other things, whether the political climate favoured the formation of AFs.   
	The local leadership was tasked with mobilising and recruiting people, whereas the State was legally and militarily responsible for the AFs. Administratively, the auxiliaries fell under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which had the responsibility for paying militia members. From a command point of view, however, the auxiliaries were controlled by the Ministry of Defence, with the UPDF training, equipping and commanding them.​[65]​ Thus, the AFs in Northern Uganda were a state-sponsored affair, which ultimately aimed at containing the LRA rebellion. I am now going to discuss how those involved in mobilising people challenged the legitimacy of Kony’s armed struggle.
4.3 Legitimising violent defensive action
Without any exception, all political leaders who were involved in mobilising people stress that it is implied in the Constitution of Uganda that citizens can supplement the government army and other law-enforcing organs to uphold or restore order in the country. Article 17 (2) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda reads as follows:
It is the duty of all able-bodied citizens to undergo military training for the defence of this Constitution and the protection of the territorial integrity of Uganda whenever called upon to do so; and the State shall ensure that facilities are available for such training.
This article proved valuable to ward off statements made by opposition politicians that forming AFs was unconstitutional.​[66]​ Thus, the GoU and its exponents constitutionally justified the existence of civil militias that could supplement the counter-insurgent efforts of the UPDF.
	However, this does not necessarily explain how discontent was framed as injustice that legitimises violent collective action against the LRA. States tend to frame violence committed by armed non-state actors (NSAs) as irrational, terrorist and criminal as a means to deny subversive organisations to legitimise their use of violence. This seems to hold true with respect to pro-government perceptions of the LRA. Often the LRA was described to me as a ‘marauding band’,​[67]​ which was ‘practising thuggery to survive in the bush’.​[68]​ Mukula, who has studied counter-terrorism in Tel Aviv, Israel, classifies the LRA as an example of ‘rural-based terrorism’.​[69]​ Interestingly, while the (Western) media are inclined to portray the LRA as an army of child soldiers indoctrinated through terror and brutality (Schomerus 2007:15), those who participated in countering Kony’s rebel group prefer to label LRA fighters as ‘thugs’ or ‘terrorists’.
It is widely argued that both insurgents and counter-insurgents cannot achieve victory without civilian support (Kalyvas 2006:91-92). Strong propaganda has proven to be instrumental in shaping people’s behaviour. Propaganda can be understood as a technique to transmit a political message. Two main reasons can be identified why the LRA lost the battle of propaganda. First, it failed to widely publicise its political agenda, which Kony himself attributes to a lack of proper propaganda machineries (Schomerus 2007:14). The GoU, on the contrary, could continuously address civilians through radio broadcasts.​[70]​ Second, the LRA alienated itself from the civilian population by directing indiscriminate violence against it. This permitted the GoU to claim to have justice on its side, although the government army does not have a clean human rights record either. In 1991, for example, NRA soldiers rounded up people in the Burcoro area who had allegedly collaborated with the LRA. In reality, however, not much effort was made to verify whether this had truly been the case. The soldiers’ captives were squeezed into a pit, which led to suffocation of about ten people. No one has ever been held accountable for the infamous Burcoro massacre.​[71]​ The government’s claim to righteousness was strengthened when the US State Department branded the LRA as a foreign terrorist organisation (US Department of State) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague issued arrest warrants for crimes against humanity and war crimes for five senior LRA leaders, including Kony himself (International Criminal Court).   
	Not only the LRA’s terror tactics inspired those justifying violent collective action against Kony’s rebels. In the non-Acholi sub-regions of Teso and Lango the ethnic factor seems to have played a significant role in mobilising people against the LRA. Many Iteso and Langi perceived the LRA, virtually an all-Acholi entity, as a ‘barbaric’ and ‘foreign’ intruder that posed a security threat to their interests (Lomo & Hovil 2004:56-58). First I am going to describe how the Iteso responded to the LRA’s invasion of Teso and after having done so I will turn to Lango. 
	When Musa Ecweru – the current State Minister for Relief and Disaster Preparedness and Refugees – learned of the LRA’s incursion into Teso, he abandoned his office as RDC in Kasese and rushed immediately to his sub-region of birth, where he was appointed as Chief Coordinator of Arrow. Referring to LRA atrocities like the 1995 Atiak massacre, he asked rhetorically to his fellow Iteso: ‘If they [the rebels] can kill their own relatives, how much can they do to ‘foreigners’?’​[72]​ Apparently, Iteso leaders deemed it necessary to refer to the LRA’s ethnic profile during the process of mobilisation. This does not seem to surprise Ecweru’s biological brother Robert Adiama, who was attached to Arrow as an overall counter-intelligence officer: ‘You look at any sentiment when you’re mobilising a force’.​[73]​ 
	Mukula admits that some Iteso leaders did play the ethnic card to mobilise people, but he says to have refrained from tribalising the issue himself, fearing it would lead to ethnic cleansing.​[74]​ Indeed, the situation grew pretty volatile in Teso. For Lwo-speakers it became quite risky to move around in the slummy sections of Soroti Town. Adiama recalls how an Acholi student was about to get lynched by an angry mob. If it had not been for Adiama and some others to intervene, the boy would have certainly been killed.​[75]​
	Apart from this tribal sentiment, there was another powerful local dynamic that Iteso leaders could exploit to mobilise people against the LRA. Teso, originally a UPC stronghold, had been through an insurgency itself. From 1986 until 1992, the Uganda People’s Army (UPA) – a Teso-based rebel group – opposed violently Museveni’s NRM Government. This armed rebellion had severely depleted Teso’s economic resources. To make matters worse, the Iteso had suffered a lot from cattle-raiding Karamojongs. Penetrations of LRA insurgents into Teso brutally disturbed the sub-region’s process of economic recovery. Local leaders were quick to realise that another insurgency was not in the (economic) interest of the war-fatigued Iteso.​[76]​
	In Lango the counter-insurgency against the LRA also acquired a bit of an ethnic dimension. The Acholi and Langi are known to have a problematic relationship, which climaxed in 1985, when Okello (an Acholi) deposed Obote (a Lango). Acholi soldiers started killing and looting in Lango following Okello’s seizure of power. In Lango these atrocities had neither been forgotten, nor forgiven. After Arrow, and subsequently Amuka, had given the LRA a rough time, the rebels retaliated by attacking Barlonyo. In the wake of the 2004 Barlonyo massacre, a vengeful crowd in Lira started rioting, looking for Acholi people. In the process a handful of people got killed. It remains unclear, however, whether these victims were actually Acholi.​[77]​ As a response to this outburst of anti-Acholi violence, a Lango-owned kiosk in Gulu Town was burned down.​[78]​ Reflecting on these series of violent incidents, Atara believes it was a wise decision to keep Amuka in Lango: ‘If they [Amuka members] had been sent into Acholi [Sub-region], the result would have been very bad’.​[79]​
4.4 Recruitment
Having discussed how violent collective action against the LRA was justified, I am now turning to the matter of recruitment, which is the next step in the process of mobilisation. The military authorities would publicly announce that there were vacancies to be filled. According to Ankunda, those who volunteered were required to be at least eighteen years of age, physically fit, disciplined, have completed their education up to level Senior 4 (four years of secondary education) and possess a letter of recommendation from their respective Local Councillor I (LCI), the leader at the community level (HRW 2003:58).  
	In reality, however, these requirements proved difficult to meet, as has already been shown with respect to the maintenance of educational standards. With regard to the requirement to be of good character, some LCIs recommended ill-disciplined elements in their communities to the UPDF, hoping that paramilitary service would discipline them. Since the UPDF Act prohibits the recruitment of persons below the age of eighteen into any armed forces, some underage candidates lied about their age. These were desperately eager to join an AF, which can be ascribed to security-related and financial motivations.​[80]​ In the field I have come across one former LDU member who joined at the age of seventeen. He says he had done so, because he wanted to prevent the LRA from abducting people in his community.​[81]​ 
	The screening of candidates was often flexibly done by the local authorities due to grave security circumstances. The menace posed by the LRA simply did not allow one to be too picky. ‘In a state of war even the disabled can be useful’, Mukula concludes soberly.​[82]​ In case of emergency, the authorities sometimes even resorted to forceful recruitment. In the field I have met one former LDU member who was forcefully recruited,​[83]​ which illustrates that at times the State was desperately in need of manpower. This case seems to be an isolated incident, nonetheless, for the bulk of militia members joined voluntarily.​[84]​    
	When looking at the social profile of militia members, Ankunda states that predominantly unemployed youngsters varying in the age from eighteen to twenty-five years served as auxiliaries.​[85]​ Unfortunately, it was problematic to verify whether this age group dominated the AFs indeed, since most (former) militia members could not tell their precise age. However, two things are for sure with concern to the groups of people serving in AFs. First, the overwhelming majority of militia members were male. With respect to Arrow, for example, the number of Arrow Girls has been put at nearly thirty.​[86]​ My sample of twelve    (ex-)LDU members included only one female. Second, a considerable number of militia members had some degree of military skills before being recruited into an AF. This characteristic has been confirmed with my interview data: one ex-UNLA soldier, two former NRA/UPDF soldiers and two ex-LRAs were to be found amongst the twelve former and serving LDU members I have interviewed. 
	Generally, the process of recruitment evolves less smoothly when pre-existing structures are absent. For Acholiland and Lango, I could not identify specific pre-existing organisations through which people were recruited. In Teso, on the other hand, the formation of Arrow was particularly spearheaded by rehabilitated UPA rebels, including Ecweru, who describes himself as ‘a beneficiary of reconciliation’.​[87]​ They convinced many of their former comrades-in-arms to take up arms against the LRA. In three months time nearly 8.000 Arrows had been mobilised, who were divided into twelve battalions, each numbering 600 to 800 troops. Initially, most Arrow battalions were led by former UPA commanders.​[88]​ Michael Bwalatum, the administrative officer of Arrow, estimates that about eighty per cent of Arrow had previously been in the bush with the UPA. Interestingly, Bwalatum had also performed administrative duties as a UPA commander.​[89]​ Adiama, now an intelligence officer of Arrow, had been a member of the UPA’s intelligence wing. Arrow’s Chief Political Commissar​[90]​ Omax Omeda had fulfilled the same role during his UPA days.​[91]​ In this sense, some consider Arrow as the reincarnation of the defunct UPA. This time, however, it was supplementing the government army instead of fighting against it.
Figure IV. Arrow detachment at Wera

A detachment of Arrow’s 3rd ‘Asamuk’ Battalion at Wera, where Arrow experienced its baptism of fire. This photograph was taken in December 2004. By then, however, LRA activity in Teso had virtually ceased.​[92]​ Note the Arrow Girl sitting in the middle. According to Mukula, the Arrow Girls proved ‘very dangerous’, teaching Kony a lesson he ‘would never forget’.​[93]​ (Courtesy of the Robert Adiama collection)
4.5 Resources
Once one had been recruited into an AF, he or she got trained and equipped, which was being done by UPDF commanders who came from all over Uganda. Having said that most militia members were ill-educated and monolingual, the question arises whether militia members could communicate properly with their commanders. In the UPDF English and KiSwahili are the official languages. All (former) LDU members mention that during their period of training they mastered some degree of functional English or KiSwahili, which enabled them to communicate with commanders who did not belong to the same tribe. Thus, any kind of language barrier had been eradicated before one was sent into battle. No (former) LDU member identifies linguistic differences as a factor that hampered communication in combat. In some cases, a UPDF commander would learn the language of his subordinates. Ochora recalls a Muganda​[94]​ officer who had become fluent in Lwo during his stay in Acholiland. He was highly liked amongst the LDU members he commanded, who in turn donated him a car of Ush. 2.500.000​[95]​ as a gesture of appreciation.​[96]​ The UPDF instructor of one of the LDU members I have interviewed also came from Central Uganda and had mastered Lwo too.​[97]​ 
According to Achoka, the duration of the training depended on the security situation, but the minimum length of training was three to six months, which he dubs as the ‘worst-case scenario’.​[98]​ Apparently, many militia members were trained under dire security circumstances, given the fact that ten out of twelve (former) LDU members I have interviewed were trained for only three to six months.
	Most interviewees, however, regard their training as ‘instructive’ and ‘sufficient’. This has undoubtedly something to do with the military background of many. One LDU member, who previously fought as a government soldier against the HSM, the UPA and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF),​[99]​ says confidently: ‘Even one month would have been sufficient to be refreshed!’​[100]​ Another LDU member, who stayed for ten years in the LRA before joining an LDU, regards his training as an ‘addition’ to his knowledge on military affairs.​[101]​
	Interestingly, most (former) LDU members who did not possess any prior fighting experience at the moment of joining also reflect positively on their training. Perhaps this can be ascribed to the nature of duties auxiliaries have (gathering intelligence, patrolling roads and policing and guarding IDP camps). Such tasks do not require extensive military training like, for instance, learning how to operate a mamba (a type of armoured vehicle),​[102]​ which takes two years.​[103]​ Whether the training militia members received was indeed sufficient, is a question I will touch upon in Chapter Six when assessing the fighting performance of the AFs.  
	Militia members were supposed to be issued with an AK-47 and a minimum of three 30-round magazines each. In addition, some militiamen were given support weapons, including light machine guns (LMGs) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).​[104]​ Most former LDU members I have interviewed say to have been equipped with two to three 30-round magazines, which some deem as insufficient. One former LDU member in particular complains about having run out of ammunition during clashes with the LRA.​[105]​ In Chapter Six I  will further discuss the shortage on ammunition militia members were facing.
Achoka identifies three reasons why some militia members were issued with only two 30-round magazines. First, the State’s financial resources were limited.​[106]​ Second, carrying lots of heavy magazines would obstruct one to hunt down fast-moving rebels. Third, he reasons that for a skilled fighter even one magazine is already sufficient: ‘Eating too much food doesn’t imply that you’re well-fed’.​[107]​ It remains questionable, however, whether a period of a few months training can deliver skilled fighters – particularly when a recruit has not acquired fighting experience in the past. Interestingly, every serving LDU member I have spoken to, says to have four magazines at his or her disposal. This might indicate that nowadays more military hardware have become available for the army’s auxiliaries. 
	Perhaps one of the best examples of the GoU failing to keep up with its constitutional obligation to provide food, medicines, allowances, uniforms, arms and ammunition is the genesis of Arrow. Since the LRA’s incursion into Teso took many by surprise, there were simply no budgetary provisions to facilitate the formation of Arrow. Consequently, local politicians, store-keepers and church leaders started donating all kinds of items, including money, food and shoes.​[108]​ Facing an acute lack of logistical support, Arrows were initially sent to the battlefield with only one magazine.​[109]​ This appalling lack of resources diminished after a few months had passed by.
4.6 Perceptions of cost-benefit
Before joining an AF, people analysed the perceived costs and benefits of participation in a government-sponsored militia. There was clearly a risk factor involved. One LDU member got abducted by the LRA while he was sent on patrol to gather intelligence. Luckily, when patrolling on his own, he always wore civilian clothes and carried traditional weapons, pretending that he was hunting anyiri (edible rat). If the LRA saw you wearing an LDU uniform, you certainly would be killed. He stayed for one year in captivity, until he managed to escape when he was ordered to fetch some water.​[110]​ Another former LDU member ran into an ambush during his first contact with LRA rebels. Several of his compatriots got killed and his unit fled in disarray.​[111]​ Not only one’s own life was at stake. The LRA turned out to be particularly interested in discouraging people to join AFs by either killing militia members or their relatives – or even worse, by killing both. One former LDU member had his home targeted and his property destroyed for several times. Fortunately, as a precaution he had hidden his family somewhere else.​[112]​     
	Nonetheless, many people decided to join. To understand such a decision, one must verify what collective and selective incentives AFs offered in return for participation. Collective incentives benefit a group of people, whilst the latter serve the interests of the individual. The prime collective incentive militias offered was protection. When it comes to selective incentives, one can think of power, financial gain, self-protection and revenge. 
Interestingly, only one former LDU member and one serving LDU member mention money as one reason, among others, for having joined. Security, either in the form of protection or self-protection, appears paramount when motivating why one decided to violently oppose the LRA. It must be borne in mind, however, that memory is often selective and incomplete and always constructed in retrospect. Although virtually all claim to have joined to defend oneself and/or one’s respective community and family, five out of six former LDU members cite delays in payment as a reason for having abandoned his LDU. This appears to be part of a widespread pattern. The vast majority of those serving in AFs left their units, because they were poorly paid, if paid at all, Samuel Egadu – Bureau Chief of Daily Monitor in Gulu – says.​[113]​ This might indicate that the provision of a salary played a larger role in decision making than most (former) militia members want one to believe.
	Kakurungu claims that delays in payment occurred incidentally, which he attributes to administrative complications: 

Some [militia] members were recruited and mobilised after the budgetary occasion had been made, making it problematic for the Ministry of Internal Affairs to incorporate their salaries into an already approved budget. This could cause a delay that lasted for three to four months, but such delays only happened to a section of the auxiliary forces.​[114]​

Delays in payment, however, cannot be exclusively attributed to bureaucracy, for it is commonly known that corruption chronically delayed the paying of those serving in AFs. Paymasters would run away with money allocated to auxiliaries (initially, militia members were paid in cash) or a corrupt government official would keep salaries aside for a couple of months to accumulate capital destined for private purposes.​[115]​ Sometimes delays would take longer than three to four months. One former LDU member recalls that once his unit threatened to go on strike, because it had not been paid for six months. Thereupon, six lorries full of soldiers were sent in to disarm the LDU in case. Its members were rearmed after the LDU had been paid.​[116]​ Another former LDU member claims he was never paid at all throughout seven years of service in an LDU.​[117]​ Irregularities in the payment of salaries are rife up to the present, which has been confirmed by serving LDU members I have interviewed. Without any exception, they all complain that they have not been paid for months.
	Apart from money and (self-)protection, revenge and power could prompt one to join. The element of revenge has been addressed in the previous chapter. Longing for power is difficult to measure, since it is unlikely that someone will frankly admit that he or she joined out of a lust for power. Bongomin, however, is convinced that some joined, because they fancied the idea of holding a gun: Those who hold guns have power.​[118]​ Whether some have misused their guns to acquire power is something I am going to address in the following chapter, which will look into, among other things, popular perceptions of the AFs. Public opinion towards militia members is based on a wide variety of things, including the discipline record of militias. Therefore, I will not touch upon the misuse of guns in this chapter.
4.7 Conclusion
As can be seen, leaders responsible for mobilising people would primarily stress how brutal the LRA was, pointing to atrocities involving rape, murder, torture, destruction of property, etcetera. Illustrative is the way Ecweru justifies his participation in Arrow in retrospect: “I will not apologise to anybody for killing Kony’s commanders and rebels, because I could not just look at my grandmothers, aunts, sisters and children being raped” (Emojong 2008). Thus, a call was made to preserve one’s sense of human dignity, which is also being expressed by Morris Adem, who was responsible for distributing food amongst Amuka detachments: ‘Instead of a rebel coming to slaughter me at home, let him get to me while I’m waiting for him. That’s why some of us stood up [to form Amuka]’.​[119]​
In contrast to Acholiland, a considerable number of people in Teso and Lango tended to understand the LRA war in terms of ethnicity, despite the fact that of all population groups in Uganda the Acholi had suffered most at the hands of Kony’s rebels. As has been described, this element of ethnicity triggered anti-Acholi riots, which Nyakairu defines as ‘the highest point of ethnisation of the [LRA] conflict’.​[120]​ In Acholiland, on the contrary, quite a few     (ex-)LDU members I have interviewed reveal that they feel sad about having fought fellow Acholi. In Teso and Lango, however, I have not encountered such sentiments. Because of its Acholi identity, the LRA was less of an intimate enemy in these sub-regions, which proved a useful source for mobilisation for those Iteso and Langi leaders who could not resist the temptation of tribalising the issue. 
The recruitment process in Teso differed from the one in Acholiland and Lango due to the presence of pre-existing structures through which people could be recruited. The infrastructure of the defunct UPA considerably smoothed the process of recruiting a rapid response force. Calling up demobilised UPA rebels to defend Teso again, this time against the LRA, must have also ignited a strong sense of solidarity. Fumerton identifies strong social solidarity as a resource “which is most crucial to mobilising counter-rebellion” (Fumerton 2002:303-304). In Acholiland and Lango, however, such powerful resources were not available to facilitate the process of recruitment.   
On the whole, the recruiting of militia members was accompanied by numerous irregularities as the GoU faced an acute shortage of troops, which has been explained in the previous chapter. Therefore, it was highly problematic to maintain the standards which had been imposed to regulate the recruiting of people into AFs. 














Having discussed why and how AFs came into being, it is now time to see how militias were looked upon, because this determined to a large extent whether the process of raising an AF evolved successfully. When looking at the third dimension of analysis, it is important to establish whether the AFs enjoyed popular support amongst the local population. Popular perceptions of the AFs were irreversibly influenced by the way militia members conducted themselves and the stance of influential persons in society, like politicians, church leaders, and so on. Public opinion towards the AFs was also profoundly shaped by the (troubled) relationship between the GoU and the people inhabiting the Greater North of Uganda, which has been addressed in Chapter Two. Obviously, these factors were closely related to each other. I have come to realise that the story concerning attitudes towards the AFs is a complicated one characterised by contradictions. And again regional differences, primarily between Acholiland and Teso, can be identified. 
5.2 The AFs in public debate 
Often non-Acholi people state that the LRA insurgency has taken so long, because the Acholi – in contrast to the people in Teso  – failed to organise themselves efficiently into self-defence militias (Lomo & Hovil 2004:57). Egadu, an Itesot​[121]​ himself, seems to echo this argument: 
When the LRA entered Teso, the leaders in Teso – like Mike Mukula and Musa Ecweru – organised the people into Arrow. There were LCVs​[122]​ taking up arms and going to the battlefield. After five to six months, the LRA was flashed out of Teso. In Acholi [Sub-region], on the other hand, there weren’t any MPs [Members of Parliament] or LCVs putting on combat attire to fight the rebels.​[123]​
Indeed, the Acholi leadership in general was reluctant to urge their fellow Acholi to join AFs. The bow-and-arrow fiasco’, which contradicts the argument that the Acholi were not willing to combat the LRA, is often cited as the main reason why Acholi leaders were less vigorous in mobilising people compared to their colleagues in Teso. Figuring the GoU would leave the Acholi ill-equipped again, a significant number of Acholi leaders refrained from encouraging their people to participate in the LDU venture.​[124]​ Apart from fearing vicious rebel reprisals, some alleged that the LDUs were part of a deliberate policy to depopulate Acholiland, because it did not support Museveni wholeheartedly. This school of thought believes that the GoU deployed community militias against the LRA to make Acholi fight Acholi and decrease casualties amongst government soldiers from the South of Uganda. Thus, the GoU initiated a ‘war from within’.​[125]​ Rukooko, for instance, is convinced that Museveni had a vested interest in transforming the war into an intra-Acholi conflict: ‘It was a full genocide. Museveni wanted the Acholi to die in large numbers, because he feared them for having controlled the military in the past’.​[126]​ 
	In Acholiland I have met lots of people who adhere to this conspiracy theory, suspecting Museveni of having genocidal aspirations with regard to the Acholi. The government’s failure to fend off the LRA has made plenty of Acholi believe that Museveni wants to have them exterminated. For these Acholi, the ‘bow-and-arrow fiasco’ is one among many traumatising experiences that evidences this accusation. I am not inclined to interpret the conflict’s protracted character as a carefully planned strategy designed by the GoU to target the Acholi. However, I am convinced that on numerous occasions the GoU has failed to deal adequately with the security crisis in the North. In the next chapter, I will present two case studies in which negligence of duty frustrated military responses to the LRA of which militia members were part of. 
In addition, there were other reasons why a considerable segment of the Acholi leadership did not approve of the formation of militias. These motivations could also be heard outside Acholiland and are not exclusively related to the historical relationship between the GoU and the Acholi. Opposition politicians, for example, reasoned that the UPDF had a defined role to guarantee the security of the people of Uganda, which made them wonder why civilians were called upon to fulfil the army’s prime constitutional duty. Besides, no legal framework had been spelled out to govern the duties and benefits of the AFs, UPC National Vice Chairman Chris Opio stresses.​[127]​ Therefore, the UPC was opposed to the formation of AFs, calling them “illegal organisations” and “tribal militias”​[128]​ that could spark ethnic violence (Uganda People’s Congress). 
	Adiama counters by saying: ‘Security is everyone’s responsibility. It’s your right to be secure, but it’s also your responsibility to create a conducive atmosphere for your own security!’​[129]​ He is one among many NRM supporters to believe that the Opposition considered Kony as a venue to teach the GoU a lesson. Disengaging people would allow the LRA to continue its brutal insurgency, from which opposition parties could benefit, capitalising on the government’s inability to crush the LRA.​[130]​ As a response, pro-militia politicians would say to those opposing the formation of militias: Tutakutana kwa kiwanja (which translated from KiSwahili means ‘We shall meet in the bush’).​[131]​ Since the bush equates rebel domain, such a response suggested that those who were opposed to the establishment of militias were colliding with the LRA. Thus, the AFs became a highly politicised matter, pitting the NRM Government against the Opposition.   
	Then, a considerable number of people, including plenty of opposition politicians, suspected the GoU of wanting to create cheap cannon fodder in the form of militias that could be deployed as far as the DRC or Sudan.​[132]​ According to HRW, this has been the case, basing such a conclusion on an interview with a “credible source” (HRW 2003:58-59). During my field work I have heard of various stories alleging that militia members have been sent abroad. For example, around 2004, about 100 Arrow Boys went missing in the Obalanga area. According to their relatives, they were transferred to the DRC, but I never found informants who could present concrete evidence to substantiate such allegations. 
When interviewing LDU members in Lukodi, however, I came across two members who had been transferred from Lango to this location in Acholiland. One of them disapproves of this transfer, reasoning the pay is too little to cover transport costs in case of visiting relatives back home in Lango.​[133]​ To make matters worse, the UPDF provides too little food and the local population only donates food to members it knows well. However, the deployment of Langi members in Lukodi has not resulted into ethnic tensions. I was told that nowadays it is quite common that Langi militia members serve in Acholiland and vice versa.​[134]​ Nonetheless, it makes one wonder whether such transfers do not run counter to the concept of AFs, which underlines the usefulness of local people, since they are trusted by the community and intimately familiar with the terrain.
Government officials vehemently deny that auxiliaries have been sent abroad, arguing that this is unlawful. According to Ochora, some militia members join the professional army, because of the (financial) benefits a government soldier is entitled to. Once one has been upgraded to a UPDF soldier, he or she can be sent anywhere. Parents who have lost children in the war are often reluctant to permit their remaining children to enlist into the UPDF, fearing they might die far away from home. Therefore, some do not inform their social environment on their promotion from militia member to government soldier, which in turn makes people believe that auxiliaries are taking part in foreign missions.​[135]​
	Another motivation why one was discouraged to join an AF was the high level of fear the LRA had instilled into the people. Kony’s use of mysticism and explicit terror made many perceive the LRA as an elusive ghost army that cannot be defeated. In Gulu Town I have met various former LRA abductees who sincerely believe that Kony could predict the course of battles due to his spiritual powers. A senior government official has admitted that besides civilians also government soldiers feared Kony’s spirits: “It is true that some UPDF troops believe that Kony may have spiritual powers. Some of their lack of vigour in pursuing the rebels can be ascribed to this, (...)” (Lomo & Hovil 2004:31). Illustrative was Archbishop and ARLPI Chairman John Baptist Odama’s response to the formation of Arrow. He discouraged people to support this anti-rebel initiative, warning it was “suicidal” to cross swords with the LRA. The Iteso leaders involved in raising Arrow ridiculed his perspective on the fighting capabilities of the LRA and Arrow, urging him to stop expressing pessimistic predictions (Karamagi 2003). Whether Odama was correct about saying that Arrow embarked on a suicide mission is something I am going to discuss in the following chapter.	
5.3 Saviours or ‘cassava soldiers’?
Having discussed reflections on the AFs in the public debate, it is interesting to establish whether (former) militia members believe they enjoyed popular support amongst the civilian population. Most (former) LDU members state that they were highly liked among civilians for providing security to their communities. Some, however, cite more specific reasons why they enjoyed popular support. One former LDU member claims that LDUs were popular, because they were the only ones that tried to make a stand against the LRA.​[136]​ Another former LDU member says that LDU members would frequently interact with the IDP population, whereas UPDF soldiers preferred to stay in their barracks, which explains why LDUs gained the people’s trust.​[137]​ A third demobilised LDU member states that LDUs were perceived as the only means that could efficiently counter the LRA, because they knew the terrain well, they were used to the climate in the North​[138]​ and most of all, ‘only Acholi know how to fight Acholi’.​[139]​ 
	Some (former) LDU members answer less positively to the question whether they enjoyed people’s support. One LDU remembers that LDUs became less popular during the period they were given the task to enforce night curfews, allowing the UPDF to have clear range in case of clashing with the LRA. Civilians resented this inconvenient measure which limited their right to freedom of movement.​[140]​ This might indicate that in some cases LDU members were viewed upon as accomplices in government oppression. 
One former LDU member admits that LDU members started stealing food from civilians, because they were underpaid. According to his understanding, the LDUs became ‘counter-productive’ in terms of creating a secure environment. He hastily added to this that people blamed the GoU for the practise of food theft, because it had failed to pay the LDUs properly.​[141]​ It remains questionable, however, whether such practices did not impact the image of LDUs more deeply. I have come to discover that in Acholiland one is sometimes inclined to refer jokingly to LDU members as keya gwana, which translated from Lwo means ‘cassava soldiers’. Apparently, some deem LDU members only fit for uprooting cassava from the civilians’ food gardens.
	I have interviewed some serving LDU members who confirm that there are civilians who have a low opinion of LDU members. One complains that some civilians do not treat LDU members respectfully, because they are poorly paid.​[142]​ Another LDU member feels frustrated about this element of disrespect: ‘Yet, we’re the ones protecting them! If it weren’t for the army code of conduct we’re subjected to, disrespectful civilians would have suffered!’​[143]​
	Indeed, up to now, the AFs are subjected to the army code of conduct to enforce discipline upon militia members. Ankunda admits that militia members committed various crimes, including cases of rape and murder.​[144]​ Rukooko points to the fact that the screening of candidates was not done vigorously, which explains the presence of criminals among the militias’ rank and file. Consequently, some militia members committed rape, robbed civilians and misused their guns to settle trivial scores (Francis 2005:224). Acts of criminality seem to have happened in every AF. Atara admits that some Amuka members did ‘bad things to get money’. For instance, they would erect roadblocks on market days, extorting contribution from civilians passing by. He ascribes Amuka’s misbehaviour to delays in payment.​[145]​ Militia members continued to cause security problems in the post-conflict phase. After the war had subsided in Teso, some Arrow Boys were hired to kill particular individuals.​[146]​ This clearly demonstrates that raising civil militias inevitably results into the proliferation of small arms, which can be considered a grave disadvantage of arming civilians.
	According to Kalyvas, militias are destined to engage in “protective violence”, but often they commit “abusive violence”, targeting the very people they ought to protect (Kalyvas 2006:108). In this sense, James Otto likens the use of militias to “using fuel to put out a fire” (Francis 2005:19). A case in point form the Self-Defence Units (SDUs) organised to protect ANC strongholds against IFP attacks. Ironically, lots of SDU members ended up spending “more time in terrorizing their communities than in protecting them” (De Klerk 1998:303). Township residents would refer to these revolutionary youngsters turned thugs as comtsotsis, a contraction of ‘comrade’ and tsotsi, township speech for ‘thug’ (Marinovich & Silva 2000:20).
	With regard to the AFs in the Greater North of Uganda, it is difficult to establish the scale of criminal activities committed by militias, since I could not access statistical data listing crimes perpetrated by militia members. It seems, however, that the AFs have not been too much of a menace to the civilian population in terms of serious offences, like rape, murder and torture. Bwalatum, for example, claims that on the whole Arrow has experienced nearly 100 cases of criminal behaviour, including acts of theft.​[147]​ Most politicians, journalists, academics, civilians, army officials and militia members themselves hardly describe cases of ill-disciplined behaviour as part of a widespread pattern. On the contrary, they rather speak of ‘incidents’ and add to this that there was not much space left for militia members to degenerate into predators preying on civilians, since the UPDF would not compromise when punishing militia members who had violated the rules. The LDU member’s remark with concern to the army code of conduct seems to confirm this.  
	Nevertheless, disturbances caused by militia members undoubtedly impacted people’s perceptions of the AFs, hence the somewhat abusive term keya gwana. Interestingly, in Teso I have not picked up terms belittling militia members. On the contrary, when I talked to the average Iteso about my research on the country’s AFs, they would quickly laud Arrow’s effort. “The Arrow Boys are our saviours, because the UPDF sleep. We really appreciate them”, an IDP told researchers in Soroti (Lomo & Hovil 2004:55). Another companion in distress expressed the same kind of feeling: “Arrows have been killing the LRA commanders. When we hear the name Arrow Boys, we feel safe” (Lomo & Hovil 2004:55). Matatus and coaches with inscriptions reading “Arrow Boys” reflect the Iteso’s gratitude towards Arrow. Such expressions of thankfulness and appreciation give me the impression that Arrow is remembered as Teso’s saviour in the collective memory of the Iteso. ‘Arrow is by far the most popular auxiliary force in Uganda’, Adiama boasts proudly.​[148]​  
	I believe two important factors can be identified why Arrow generated considerable support amongst the Iteso, whereas in Acholiland people at times would ridicule the LDUs. First, Teso is known as the most NRM-friendly sub-region north of the Nile. To put it in the words of a Soroti resident: “They say the Iteso are the strongest supporters of the [National Resitance] Movement in the north, (...)” (Lomo & Hovil 2004:53). Since the formation of AFs was essentially an initiative coordinated by NRM exponents, Teso’s militia enjoyed a higher degree of legitimacy amongst the local populace than the LDUs in Acholiland, where support for the NRM was considerably less. Second, Arrow’s counter-insurgent efforts reaped more tangible results, which permitted Arrow to present itself as the force that halted the advance of one of Africa’s most feared rebel armies. I will elaborate on this in the next chapter.
5.4 Conclusion
As can be seen, not everyone in the Greater North of Uganda was convinced that AFs were created to man people’s security. This sense of mistrust was particularly articulated by opposition politicians, arguing that the AFs were unconstitutional and served primarily the interests of the NRM Government. 
I have come to discover that such suspicions were most entrenched in Acholiland, where the disillusionment about the ‘bow-and-arrow fiasco’ was still very much alive. Acholi leaders feared the State would leave their people outgunned again. With the LRA committing hundreds of large scale massacres in Acholiland​[149]​ and LDU members engaging in (petty) crime, some Acholi believed it was futile to mobilise people against rebels who continuously succeeded in outmanoeuvring the UPDF. Moreover, many Acholi perceived LDUs as mechanisms established to make Acholi fight Acholi. 









In the last three chapters I have described why and how people in the Greater North of Uganda resorted to violent defensive action against the LRA, which culminated into the formation of various AFs. As has been stressed, these militias were formed under different conditions owing to local dynamics, such as past experiences, ethnicity, the political climate, and so on. When assessing the performance of the AFs, one can point to regional differences again. It is widely believed that Arrow has proven to be most successful in fighting off the LRA. In this chapter I will, among other things, explain why the counter-insurgency against the LRA in Teso differed from the one in the Lwo-speaking sub-regions of Acholiland and Lango. 
	Before I am going to discuss the uniqueness about Arrow’s counter-insurgent effort, I will look into one of the factors that contributed to the prolonging of the LRA insurgency. Numerous reasons can be identified why the LRA rebellion took so long. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address them all. One, however, pertains to the cooperation between the UPDF and the AFs and therefore, I deem it necessary to touch upon this aspect of the conflict in Northern Uganda. Mukula and Adiama state quite reasonably that, among other factors, the insurgency kept on going due to a lack of rapid response mechanisms (RRMs), such as armoured personnel carriers (APCs), helicopter gunships, tanks, etcetera.​[151]​ I will use two case studies, the infamous massacres at Atiak and Barlonyo, to demonstrate that militias could have been used more efficiently had there been a higher level of sophistication.  
6.2 The 1995 Atiak massacre
The Atiak massacre was particularly shocking, because it was one of the biggest massacres in post-colonial Uganda and partly coordinated by a then junior commander Vincent Otti,​[152]​ whose home is located near Atiak. The involvement of a community member in the butchering of hundreds of his own people goes beyond everyone’s imagination (Nyakairu 2008). The massacre left deep marks on the people in Atiak, which I have witnessed myself when interviewing survivors of this outrage.
	Listening to their stories, I somehow reconstructed what happened there on that dreadful day in April. It is evident that the thirty-five to forty LDU members in Atiak could not match the rebel’s firepower and strength. After a brief but heavy exchange of gunfire, they were overpowered by the LRA.​[153]​ Besides killing live-stock, burning huts and looting stores, the rebels rounded up hundreds of residents, who were forced to walk westwards for a while. At a particular moment, the LRA separated pregnant women and young children from the rest of the captives. While the former stood aside, the others were ordered to lie flat on the ground. Subsequently, they were showered with bullets (Justice and Reconciliation Project 2007:4-6). The rebels reasoned the Atiak people deserved to be severely punished, because they were ‘too close to the Government [of Uganda]’.​[154]​ After this orgy of violence had come to an end, the rebels summoned the group of spared people to applaud for what they had ‘accomplished’, a survivor who lost two of his brothers narrates.​[155]​
	All three survivors agreed that Atiak’s LDU, which consisted predominantly of youths, was hopelessly outnumbered, poorly trained and ill-equipped. Having been trained for a short period of three months, they lacked instructions regarding battle-tactics. To make matters worse, they had been issued with only one magazine each.​[156]​ It seems that the LDU in case did not possess proper communication tools to inform the nearest army detachment, which was deployed a couple of kilometres away from Atiak, on the rebels’ attack. When government soldiers finally arrived afoot, the rebels had already left the site of the massacre.​[157]​   	
	Judging these statements, it is safe to argue that the defence of Atiak was poorly organised. The LDU could clearly not keep up with its tasks, owing to a shortage on manpower, ammunition and expertise. Moreover, there seems to have been no line of proper communication between Atiak’s LDU and the government army. Once the latter learned of the attack, it did not have the means of transport to move quickly to the scene of action, which again cost a lot of precious time. Another missed opportunity was the fact that one day prior to the attack some LDU members had spotted about fifteen rebels east of Atiak. The very next day the rebels would indeed attack from this side.​[158]​ Apparently, it was not deemed important to carefully investigate the LDU’s observation concerning LRA activity in the Atiak area. Due to this accumulation of faults the LRA could undisturbedly slaughter hundreds of civilians in Otti’s home town.
 6.3 The 2004 Barlonyo massacre
It is sad to observe that nine years later the same mistakes were repeated at Barlonyo. This big massacre can be understood as a revenge killing by the rebels, who were full of rage about having failed to open a new front in Teso.​[159]​ The attack was led by Okot Odhiambo, who was reportedly killed by Kony in mid-April 2008 (Nyakairu & Matsiko 2008). Up to now, some people claim that it were UPDF soldiers disguised as LRA rebels who massacred people at Barlonyo. This does not seem likely, however, since some of the children who got abducted during the attack have returned home. After their escape from the bush they could mention the names of LRA commanders they had been assigned to.​[160]​ 
	At around 17.00, the LRA began bombing the camp. Barlonyo harboured about forty to sixty Amuka members, who had been passed out in December 2003. They did seek to make a stand, but being outnumbered and outgunned (they had two magazines each), they were quickly overrun. Thereupon, the rebels started setting huts ablaze, looting and killing people. In the carnage that ensued over 300 IDPs got killed. The attackers, all Lwo-speaking, finally disappeared when they learned that mambas were on their way.​[161]​
	Again, militia members could not prevent the LRA from massacring civilians on a large scale. One survivor who lost his wife and daughter reflects sadly: ‘If these people [Barlonyo’s Amuka detachment] had been fully trained, fully armed and with many, this massacre could have been prevented’.​[162]​ Other factors can be identified why rebels could kill with impunity for about two hours. To begin with, there was poor, if any, communication between Barlonyo’s Amuka members and the UPDF. One was supposed to either run or cycle for seven kilometres to get to the nearest office from where the military could be rung (at the time of the attack there was no mobile telephone network in Barlonyo).​[163]​ Then, the road running from Lira Town to Barlonyo was in a bad condition, which made it even problematic for mambas to access the village under attack.​[164]​ Likewise in Atiak, the Barlonyo attack could have been expected. According to one survivor, a former LRA abductee who managed to escape at Abia had warned Barlonyo’s officer-in-charge (OC) that the LRA intended to either attack Barlonyo or Ogur. The OC, however, dismissed his warning as ‘street talk’.​[165]​ This remains quite an enigma to me, since there were clear indications that rebels were around. Two days prior to the massacre, one resident’s son got abducted while herding cattle. The LRA, on the other hand, could easily obtain intelligence regarding Barlonyo’s defences as the camp was not properly fenced off. Disguised as IDPs, rebels would sneak into Barlonyo to assess Amuka’s strength on the ground.​[166]​
	Essentially, Barlonyo was Atiak all over again. The local militia lacked proper training, manpower and equipment to repel the attack. In addition, it did not have the means to immediately inform the army on the attack. The army, in turn, experienced logistical difficulties to reach the place. Such unfavourable conditions frustrated any attempt to respond rapidly to rebel activity. And that is what counter-insurgency, in fact, is all about: responding rapidly. In order to act adequately, it is of crucial importance to have decent intelligence, for ‘every military success is based on intelligence’, Adiama – a seasoned intelligence officer – lectures.​[167]​ With respect to Atiak and Barlonyo, it seems that not much effort was made to anticipate movements made by the LRA. Consequently, the UPDF and its auxiliaries struggled badly with an intelligence gap. It is interesting to see how Arrow dealt with intelligence challenges. 
6.4 Explaining Arrow’s success story
As the story of Barlonyo has demonstrated, the rebels could merge themselves into the local population, pretending to be civilians. The narrative of a former LRA abductee, who was tasked with abducting people himself, confirms this. Dressed in civilian clothes, he would go to the market, socialising with the civilian population. Meanwhile, his fellow rebels would seal off the place and capture the people by surprise.​[168]​
	The difficulty to distinguish friend from foe is a recurring problem of guerrilla warfare, which Kalyvas calls the ‘identification problem’. Counter-insurgents in particular face an identification problem; it is their opponents who hide after all (Kalyvas 2006:89-90). NRA excesses in the Greater North of Uganda in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s can be understood as frustrations about failing to isolate rebels from the civilian population.​[169]​ On July 11th, 1989, for example, fifty-five alleged UPA rebels were roasted alive in a train wagon by NRA soldiers at Mukura. In reality, however, the victims turned out to be innocent civilians.​[170]​
The identification problem, however, is not only confined to counter-insurgents. In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, for instance, the military training camps of uMkhonto weSizwe (MK),​[171]​ the ANC’s armed wing, in Angola became the scene of a major crisis within the ANC. Some desperate counter-intelligence officers of Mbokodo (‘Grindstone’), the ANC security department, had resorted to torture to extract information from cadres who were suspected of being impimpis (‘government spies’). Such atrocious spy-catching methods led to resentment amongst the ordinary cadres, who in turn mutinied heavily. A special commission was needed to look into the explosive situation and calm matters down (Bopela & Luthuli 2005:173-177). 
	Unlike the counter-insurgents in Acholiland and Lango, Arrow did not face an identification problem in Teso. The rebels had no command of Ateso, the local language, which implies that they could not intermingle with the local population as they were used to do in Acholiland and Lango. The Iteso, in turn, cooperated fully with Arrow, with many civilians volunteering to gather intelligence. In addition, Arrow had a cleverly constructed intelligence system at its deposal. Cellular phones and airtime were distributed amongst villagers, because the LRA could access the frequency of the army’s radio communications system, but it could not tap mobile telephone calls. As civilians were instructed to transmit messages exclusively in Ateso, the rebels would not have understood them anyway.​[172]​  
	The geographical conditions were also unfavourable to the rebels. Teso is a rather flat and swampy sub-region, which increases the risk of disclosure (Lomo & Hovil 2004:55). In addition, this time the counter-insurgents were more familiar with the terrain features than their opponents, because the latter had not been active in Teso before. Most of all, as the LRA had been bereft of its sanctuary in Southern Sudan, they had nowhere to go to regroup itself after a military engagement. Adiama stresses that the LRA made a strategic mistake by crossing into Teso:
	They [the rebels] did not understand the factors surrounding their successes in Gulu [District]. You should have a base to retreat to after having hit a target. For them, they could fight in Acholiland and reorganise themselves in Sudan. In case of hitting Teso, it’s a long walk back to Sudan.​[173]​
Bard E. O’Neill, a renowned authority on insurgency and terrorism, argues that external support is as important as popular support (O’Neill 1990:111). Having lost Khartoum as its ally, the LRA’s fighting capacity had been severely crippled and therefore, Ankunda believes that ‘Iron Fist’ paved the way for the recent peace process held in Juba, South Sudan.​[174]​ To underline the importance of external support, a lack of external support is repeatedly cited as one of the main reasons why the UPA surrendered on May 2nd, 1992. Adiama is convinced that ‘if the UPA had been sponsored by Khartoum, it would have been a different story’.​[175]​
	With the rebels ‘playing an away match’ against Arrow, the former sustained severe casualties. As many as forty-three LRA commanders got killed in Teso, including Brigadier Charles Tabuley who was shot dead in Kaberamaido District (British Broadcasting Company). Many LRA commanders lost their lives in the axis of Kaberamaido, where Arrow’s 9th ‘Otuboi’ and 10th ‘Kaberamaido’ Battalions were operating.​[176]​ Tabuley’s death dealt a huge blow to the LRA. Ecweru characterises him as ‘the best combatant Kony has ever had’, forming ‘the brain behind the LRA in terms of military capacity’.​[177]​
The first LRA commander to be killed by Arrow was Luono Opio, who died at Odudui on October 9th, 2003 (Nieuws.nl). He was gunned down by an Arrow of 8th ‘Arapai’ Battalion​[178]​ as Adiama recalls vividly:
The LRA overran an Arrow detachment at Odudui Health Centre. One Arrow Boy remained in his home and hit him [Opio] in the back while he was directing his troops. He died instantly. When Opio’s men were about to attack the gunman, armoured carriers came to the rescue, relieving the boy who killed Opio.​[179]​  
Figure V. Unidentified LRA commander killed in action

On September 29th, 2005, the last LRA commander to die at the hands of Arrow was killed at Iyalakwe. Initially, he was believed to be the infamous Brigadier Dominic Ongwen, but it appeared that this was not the case. Up to now, the person’s identity has remained unknown. His death marked the end of LRA activity in Teso. The corpse was publicly displayed in the towns of Amuria and Soroti to demonstrate the LRA’s vulnerability. Note the man’s dreadlocks, one of the LRA’s trademarks.​[180]​ (Courtesy of the Robert Adiama Collection)
	The LRA could not sustain Arrow’s fire and after a few months of intense fighting the war in Teso subsided more or less. The defeat the LRA suffered in Teso shattered its image of an untouchable and invincible guerrilla group. Ecweru reflects:
Before we [Arrow] resisted them [the rebels], it was very difficult for some elements in Acholi society to imagine that the LRA could be defeated. (…) The LRA had created a myth that it was suicidal to fight them. It was Arrow that demystified the LRA.​[181]​ (Emphasis added)
Adiama agrees on his brother’s opinion: ‘Militarily, the backbone of the LRA was broken in Teso. Arrow demystified and redefined the LRA’s military capacity’.​[182]​ (Emphasis added) Bwalatum is satisfied with Arrow’s fighting performance too: ‘For us [Arrow], it was a very good war. We broke his [Kony’s] back; that’s why he’s in Garamba [National Park], DRC.’​[183]​ 
To Mapenduzi it is crystal clear who should be praised for the LRA’s defeat in Teso: ‘It were the Arrow Boys who fought the LRA out of Teso. That credit should be given to them; not to the UPDF’.​[184]​ The Arrow leadership, however, is careful about proportioning credit. Ecweru, for example, cautions: ‘Victory is too sweet to be shared equally; it’s only easy to share sorrow’. He rather describes Arrow’s contribution in terms of a ‘supplementary effort’.​[185]​ Mukula speaks of a ‘combined effort’, pointing to the fact that the UPDF provided Arrow with military hardware, uniforms and training.​[186]​ 
6.5. Conclusion
The massacres at Atiak and Barlonyo illustrate that on some occasions the counter-insurgents were exasperatingly slow to respond to security threats posed by the LRA. The communication between the UPDF and its auxiliaries was poor and no serious attempts were made to fill intelligence gaps, which left Kony’s opponents fighting blind. To make matters worse, local militiamen were often outgunned, outnumbered and outsmarted by the rebels as survivors of both massacres testify. This makes one doubt whether (former) LDU members were right when saying that short periods of training were sufficient.




The central theoretical problem of this thesis is to reconstruct the process by which AFs were organised and mobilised. In doing so, I divided this research question into three constituent parts, which form the components of the collective action theoretical framework: discontent, mobilisation and political opportunity. These three notions permitted me to explore the dynamics and identify the mechanisms of collaboration between the GoU and Northern Ugandans. Thus, I sought to establish why and how people resorted to violent defensive action against the LRA.
	With respect to the first dimension, on the one hand, Kony’s strategic use of fear paralysed both government soldiers and civilians. On the other hand, the LRA became too much of an explicit terror, prompting people to join civil militias. These zonal forces significantly reduced the room in which the rebels could manoeuvre, demonstrating that in the end the LRA’s terror tactics proved counter-productive. However, people did not join AFs exclusively out of discontent with Kony’s atrocious behaviour. Due to massive internal displacement many found themselves having no other option left, given the limitations of their social and economic resources. It must be borne in mind that people’s behaviour to opt for violent collective action cannot be merely understood in terms of discontent. Kalyvas’ theoretical paradigm concerning the relationship between control and collaboration proved helpful in exploring how a high level of control exercised by the GoU ignited many Northern Ugandans to collaborate with a government, of which they did not necessarily approve. The State, in turn, relied heavily on AFs, because the government army was too thin on the ground for several reasons. Thus, two entities whose relationship was historically characterised by mistrust ended up cooperating in the face of a common enemy. 
	When looking into the mobilisational dimension, it can be seen that Kony’s use of explicit terror backfired again, permitting his opponents to legitimise violent defensive action against his rebel army. In contrast to Acholiland, the mobilisation process in Teso and Lango was accompanied by ethnic tensions, with some Iteso and Langi leaders portraying LRA rebels as ‘barbaric’ and ‘warlike’ ‘foreigners’. Another powerful source Iteso leaders could use was the UPA experience from the past. Mobilising people along UPA lines significantly smoothed the process of building up a militia.  
	Regarding the third dimension of analysis, the public opinion towards the formation of AFs was most favourable in Teso, where most NRM supporters north of the Nile could be found. Since the AFs were essentially a state-coordinated initiative, the idea of forming a government-related militia enjoyed most legitimacy amongst the Iteso populace. Acholiland, on the contrary, voiced the strongest objections to the recruitment of civilians into militias. The ‘bow-and-arrow fiasco’ was still fresh in the Acholi’s minds. Additionally, people in Acholiland had grown sceptical about mobilising against the LRA, with the government’s inability to respond rapidly (hence the Atiak massacre, for example) and the rebels using Southern Sudan as a safe haven from where they could launch surprise attacks. 
	It was Arrow that grew out to be the most successful and popular militia. These two characteristics are undoubtedly related to each other. The Iteso’s enthusiastic support of Arrow enabled Arrow to counter the LRA efficiently and this, in turn, increased Arrow’s popularity. A ‘cocktail’ of factors can be ascribed to Arrow’s successes. First, Teso’s mobilising capacity proved to be quite powerful, which has been summarised in the last two paragraphs. Within a short time span, the LRA faced an opponent to be reckoned with. Second, Arrow succeeded in neutralising the identification problem through using Ateso as lingua franca and an unbreakable system of transmitting intelligence. Third, the rebels were unfamiliar with the terrain and by the time the war reached Teso, they had already been deprived of their sanctuary in Southern Sudan. As a result, the LRA could no longer successfully play its beloved cat-and-mouse game and found itself unable to sustain its activities in Teso.
	As I have mentioned previously, the formation of auxiliaries stirred a lot of debate in the public realm. When it comes to assessing their contribution, they are also a hotly disputed issue. Whereas Ankunda states that the AFs were ‘largely successful’,​[187]​ Bongomin believes that in general their performance was ‘extremely poor’.​[188]​ Rukooko’s stance appears more prudent and pragmatic at the same time. One the one hand, some militia members committed human rights violations themselves and on the other hand, in some cases they successfully battled the LRA, like Arrow did in Teso. In this sense, Rukooko regards the AFs as a ‘necessary evil’.​[189]​
	
Indeed, the story of the AFs in the Greater North of Uganda is a pretty mixed one. No unambiguous observations can be made with concern to these community-based forces. In the field I got exposed to a wide variety of perceptions that differed from sub-region to sub-region, political alignment to political alignment, tribe to tribe, etcetera. Nonetheless, I would like to make one final concluding remark. Regrettably, the UPDF and its auxiliaries often failed to defend the people due to poor coordination, communication, facilitation, infrastructure and organisation. The rebels, in turn, took mercilessly advantage of security loopholes that had come into being. Under more favourable circumstances, however, the commitment and expertise of militia members did bear fruit, to the point that Kony – a mysterious rebel leader who had supposedly taken bush warfare to a higher level – was demystified. This crucial lesson ought to be taken into account when employing civil militias to counter an insurgency.  
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^1	  On February 21st, 2004, the LRA attacked Barlonyo (an IDP camp near Lira Town), massacring 309 civilians.
^2	  Interview with James Nyeko in Gulu Town, April 5 2008.
^3	  Interview with Fabius Okumu in Gulu Town, May 23 2008.
^4	  No hits are to be found when looking for articles on militias in relation to the LRA insurgency.
^5	  The Greater North of Uganda is comprised of Acholiland, Karamoja, Lango, Teso and West Nile. I have confined my area of research to the sub-regions of Acholi, Lango and Teso, which bore the brunt of LRA activity in Uganda. 
^6	  In total, the conflict displaced approximately 800.000 persons in Acholi Sub-region, constituting seventy per cent of the population of Acholiland. In mid-2003, the LRA expanded its area of operations to Teso and Lango, forcing nearly 400.000 people in Teso and 300.000 people in Lango to become displaced. With the war having subsided, plenty of IDPs are moving back to their respective homes.    
^7	  The Acholi and Langi are Lwo-speaking peoples, who respectively inhabit Acholiland and Lango. Teso Sub-region is home to the Iteso, who in turn speak Ateso. Both are Nilotic languages.
^8	  Also known as Luweero,
^9	  This triangle was located in Central Uganda to the north-west of Kampala.
^10	  Interview with a former UPDF major in Kampala, March 21 2008.
^11	  Interviews with Frank Nyakairu in Kampala, May 1 2008, Walter Ochora in Gulu Town, May 20 2008 and Chris Opio in Kampala, June 2 2008.
^12	  The RDC is personally appointed by the president and tasked with representing the central government in a particular district. Ochora fought as a UNLA officer during the bush war. Subsequently, he joined the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), a rebel group based in Northern Uganda. After the UPDA had suspended its armed struggle in 1988, he was pardoned and absorbed into the NRA. Ochora is nowadays known as a staunch supporter of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the country’s ruling party. 
^13	  Interview with Walter Ochora in Gulu Town, May 20 2008. 
^14	  Singular of Langi.
^15	  This was a result of the British strategy of ‘divide and rule’. The colonial administration deemed the ‘martial’ Nilotic tribesmen in the North, particularly the Acholi, fit for military service in the King’s African Rifles (KAR), whereas Southerners were destined to function as civil servants. Northerners continued to dominate the government army after Uganda had attained its political independence in 1962.
^16	  Singular of Banyankole.
^17	  Interview with Frank Nyakairu in Kampala, May 1 2008.
^18	  The NRA was renamed the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), following the enactment of the 1995 Constitution.
^19	  The Karamojongs, feared as notorious cattle-raiders, are said to believe that all cattle is theirs by a divine right. Thus, they do not rustle live-stock, but actually ‘reclaim’ it.
^20	  She said to be possessed by several spirits of whom Lakwena (meaning ‘Messenger’) appeared to be the most prominent one.
^21	  Interview with Charles Bongomin in Kampala, March 26 2008.
^22	  Interview with a former NRA soldier in Kampala, March 22 2008.
^23	  Interview with Severino Lukoya Kiberu in Gulu Town, April 6 2008.
^24	  Interview with Charles Bongomin in Kampala, March 26 2008.
^25	  Interview with Walter Ochora in Gulu Town, May 20 2008.
^26	  Latek had joined Kony’s rebel faction and was reportedly killed by NRA units in 1989.
^27	  Interview with Walter Ochora in Gulu Town, May 20 2008.
^28	  Not to be mistaken for the Arrow militia, which was founded in Teso Sub-region in 2003.
^29	  Interviews with Francis Achoka in Gulu Town, April 4 2008 and Frank Nyakairu in Kampala, May 29 2008.
^30	  Interview with Paddy Ankunda in Kampala, March 25 2008.
^31	  Once the Home Guards’ area of operations was expanded beyond their actual homes, the term Home Guard was no longer considered to be appropriate.
^32	  Also known as Attiak.
^33	  Interview with Paddy Ankunda in Kampala, March 25 2008.
^34	  During the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), for example, the British implemented a ‘scorched earth’ policy of destroying farms, slaughtering live-stock and forcibly evicting Boer women, children and old people from their homes to deny Boer commandos any form of support on the veld.
^35	  Interview with Francis Achoka in Gulu Town, April 4 2008.
^36	  Unlike the Arrow Groups, the Arrows were issued with AK-47 assault rifles. The name ‘Arrow’ indicated the Iteso’s sharpness and confidence to fight off the LRA. 
^37	  Interview with Felix Okot Ogong in Kampala, May 29 2008.
^38	  Interview with A. Byaruhanga Rukooko in Kampala, March 21 2008.
^39	  Interview with Francis Achoka in Gulu Town, April 4 2008.
^40	  Interviews with a former LDU member in Ajulu-Patiko, April 2 2008 and with an LDU member in Lukodi, April 17 2008.
^41	  Interview with Tonny Atara in Lira Town, May 16 2008.
^42	  Interview with an LDU member in Ajulu-Patiko, April 15 2008.
^43	  This was the only case of forceful recruitment I have detected in the field. 
^44	  Interview with a former LDU member in Ajulu-Patiko, April 11 2008.
^45	  I have observed this myself during my travels throughout Acholi Sub-region.
^46	  Interview with Paddy Ankunda in Kampala, March 25 2007.
^47	  Interview with Charles Bongomin in Kampala, March 26 2008.
^48	  On May 19th, 2004, the LRA massacred 45 villagers at Lukodi.
^49	  60.000 Ugandan shillings equal €23,39.
^50	  Interview with Charles Bongomin in Kampala, March 26 2008.
^51	  Interview with Francis Achoka in Gulu Town, April 4 2008.
^52	  Interview with Ronald Kakurungu in Gulu Town, April 9 2008.
^53	  Interviews with Walter Ochora in Gulu Town, May 20 2008 and Fabius Okumu in Gulu Town, May 23 2008.
^54	  Interview with Dennis Ojwee in Gulu Town, May 23 2008.
^55	  Interview with Fabius Okumu in Gulu Town, May 23 2008.
^56	  Standard UPDF units are composed as follows: platoon (36 troops), company (124 troops), battalion (736 troops), brigade (2.500 troops) and an infantry division (10.000 troops).
^57	  Interview with Ronald Kakurungu in Gulu Town, April 9 2008.
^58	  Mapenduzi is aligned to the opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC).
^59	  Interview with Martin Mapenduzi in Gulu Town, April 16 2008.
^60	  140.000 Ugandan shillings equal €54,63.
^61	  Interview with Francis Achoka in Gulu Town, April 4 2008.
^62	  Interview with A. Byaruhanga Rukooko in Kampala, March 21 2008
^63	  Interview with Francis Achoka in Gulu Town, April 4 2008.
^64	  Interview with Walter Ochora in Gulu Town, May 20 2008.
^65	  Interview with Paddy Ankunda in Kampala, March 25 2008.
^66	  Interviews with Walter Ochora in Gulu Town, May 20 2008, Musa Ecweru in Kampala, May 30 2008 and Omax Omeda in Soroti Town, June 30 2008.
^67	  Interview with Francis Achoka in Gulu Town, April 4 2008.
^68	  Interview with Morris Adem in Lira Town, May 18 2008.
^69	  Interview with Mike Mukula in Kampala, May 2 2008.
^70	  Interview with Mike Mukula in Kampala, May 2 2008.
^71	  Interview with a former resident of Burcoro in Burcoro, May 11 2008.
^72	  Interview with Musa Ecweru in Kampala, May 30 2008.
^73	  Interview with Robert Adiama in Soroti Town, June 23 2008.
^74	  Interview with Mike Mukula in Kampala, May 2 2008.
^75	  Interview with Robert Adiama in Soroti Town, June 23 2008.
^76	  Interviews with Mike Mukula in Kampala, May 2 2008 and Robert Adiama in Soroti Town, June 23 2008.
^77	  Interview with Tonny Atara in Lira Town, May 16 2008.
^78	  Interview with Fabius Okumu in Gulu Town, May 23 2008.
^79	  Interview with Tonny Atara in Lira Town, May 16 2008.
^80	  Interview with Fabius Okumu in Gulu Town, May 23 2008.
^81	  Interview with a former LDU member in Ajulu-Patiko, April 11 2008.
^82	  Interview with Mike Mukula in Kampala, May 2 2008.
^83	  Interview with a former LDU member in Ajulu-Patiko, April 11 2008.
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